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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

...

RIQO-M PEREA,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

vs.

...

STATE OF UTAH 1

Appellate Court No. 201501445CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is. an appeal from an Order of Summary Dismissal on the

~

Petitioner's Petition for Relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
···-filed- November 11, 2014 as well-as-the· Order on Petitioner's Metien-£or~--~
.....

Relief from Judgment entered on October 16, 2015. Jurisdiction of This
Court is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)G).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

POINT I

1

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
6o(b)(6) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
THEREBY VIOLATE HIS STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS?

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: The issue was preserved by the filing of
the Rule 6o(b)(6) motion with the court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Court of Appeals review of a District
Court's denial of a 6o(b) motion is under an abuse of discretion standard of
vu

review. There are limits to the discretion of the District Court however as
set forth in the case of Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,I 54, 150 P.3d 480,
where the court held:
The majority of Menzies' arguments on appeal deal with the district
court's 6o(b) ruling. A district court has broad discretion to rule on a
motion to set aside a default judgment under rule 6o(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 ur 75, ,I 9, 11 P.3d
277; Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984); State Dep't
of Soc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983). Thus,
we review a district court's denial of a 6o(b) motion *502 under an
abuse of discretion standard of review. Russell, 681 P.2d at 1194.
However, we have emphasized that "the [district] court's discretion is
riot unlimited." Lund, ·2000 · UT 75, ,I 9, 11 P.3d· 277. It is well ·
established that 6o(b) motions should be liberally granted because of
the equitable nature of the rule. Id. ,I 10. Therefore, a district court
should exercise its discretion in favor of granting relief so that
controversies can be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities. See id.; Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56. Accordingly,
it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a 6o(b) motion
to set aside a default judgment if there is a reasonable justification for
the moving party's failure and the party requested 6o(b) relief in a
timely fashion. Lund, 2000 UT 75, ,I 11, 11 P.3d 277
2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

United States Constitution
Sixth Amendment - Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

Fourteenth Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and
Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.

Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of
law.
----Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]

.. In criminal prosecutions_the accused shall have the right to appear_a.....n~d.___ __
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own belf='all£f,~--. · · --·--to· be-confronted by the witnesses against him,·-to have compulsory-process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
3

public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination,
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.

Utah Code Annotated
§76-5-202 Aggravated Murder (in relevant part)
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the

actor
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the
following circumstances:
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of
conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons were killed,
or during which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition
to the victim who was killed;

4

§78A-4-103(2)G)
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: cases transferred to the Court
of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
Rule 6o(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud · (whether · heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 90 days after
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under
this Subdivision (b) does not affect the :finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defendant was charged by Information with two counts of
Aggravated Murder, a Capital felony in violation of UCA

§76-5-202

together with three other felony charges. On March 9, 2010 through March

16, 2010,

the case was tried to a jury and on March 16, 2010, the jury found

the defendant guilty of all five counts of the information. (R.
appellate case no.

20100891).

On May

no.

in

the defendant was

27, 2010,

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. R.

1375-84

1566

in appellate case

20100891).

A Petition for Relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act was
filed by Petitioner on November 12, 2014, and was summarily dismissed on
January

12, 2015. An

appeal was filed on February 11,

for relief from judgment was filed on July

23, 2015.

2015

and a motion

After remand to the

trial court, the trial court issued a ruling denying the motion on October 16,
2015.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

In 2007 the Petitioner Riqo Perea was charged with two counts of

Aggravated Murder, a Capital Felony, together with two counts of
Attempted Aggravated Murder, a first-degree felony.
2.

This case went to trial beginning March 9,

2010

and concluding with

a guilty verdict to all charges rendered by the jury on March 16, 2010.
3.

The matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and

although the court found numerous errors, the judgment was affirmed
6

based upon the Utah Supreme Court's finding that the errors were
harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. This overwhelming
evidence of guilt was founded on the testimony of Sarah Valencia, who
testified that she witnessed Riqo Perea shooting the fatal and wounding
shots. (See State v. Perea, 2013 UT, 322 P.3d 624, a copy of that decision
is attached as Addendum A to this brief)
4.

On November 12, 2014, the petitioner filed the current petition

under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and that petition was denied by
this court on October 16, 2015. (See copy of Ruling and Order attached as
Addendum B to this brief).

5.

The judgment on that matter was then appealed to the Utah

Supreme Court on February 11, 2015. (See notice of appeal attached as
Addendum C to this brief).
6.

On July 2, 2015 Sarah Valencia came into the office of Randall

W. Richards and declared that she wanted to sign an affidavit recanting
the testimony that she had given the trial due to the fact that it was
incorrect, and she had been pressured to testify falsely due to threats by
the police. (A copy of that affidavit is attached as Addendum D to this
brief).

7

7.

A review of that affidavit would clearly indicate that her

testimony given at the trial of petitioner Rigo Perea, was false, and in
large part resulted in his conviction and life sentence, which was
--a

thereafter affirmed by the Supreme Court of Utah.
8.

There were only three other witnesses that potentially put the

gun in the hand of Rigo Perea. Two of those witnesses, Angelo Gallegos,
and Elias Garcia were both potential suspects and both testified against
Rigo Perea and as a result were not charged. (The relevant portions of
those witnesses testimony are attached as Addendum E to this brief).
9.

The other witness, Dominique Duran, gave a very contradictory

testimony, with claims that she did not remember what happened that
night. The only evidence that implicated Rigo Perea was actually read to
vJ

the witness and she simply gave her affirmation. On page 26 of the trial
transcript of her testimony she makes the following response to the
question:
Q. Do you remember during the course of this statement Detective

John Thomas, who's seated right here in the courtroom, coming to
you and emphasizing that it was important for you to tell the truth?
A. Yes. He threatened me a lot, yes.
10.

Since the testimony of Sarah Valencia is absolutely essential for

the court to make a reasoned decision on this Rule 6o(b) motion, the
8

relevant portions of that testimony are included '-'Vith the trial transcript
pages as follows:
Pg. 85--86 (Direct)
(After arguing begins in the street) "That's when me and Sabrina
went in to get Anthony, because it was his house, thinking maybe
that he could maybe stop the argument from going on. All I
remember is being inside, and Ashley Gill ran in and said there was a
shot in the air. And we went back outside, and that's when I seen the
SUV pulling off, and I seen Riqo over the top, shooting."
Pg. 92--95 (Direct)
Q. When you gave that first statement did you tell the police that
Riqo was the shooter?
A.No.
Q. Why not?
A. I was scared.
Q. Why were you scared?
A Because I was getting threatened.
Q. How were you being threatened?
A Phone calls.
Q. Do you know who was making the phone calls?
A. I don't.
Q. This is the middle of the night, correct? 1, 2, 3 am?
A. Uh--huh
Q. Did you the following day, on the morning of the 5th, Sunday, I
believe, did you in fact go to the Ogden City Police Department and
provide another statement, a detailed statement, question and
answer statement to a detective?
A Yes
Q. What time did that take place?
A. Maybe 9, 10.
Q. It was daylight out; is that right?
A. Yes
Q. And whaLdid...Jron do between the time you__were_at.the hospital
and the time you went down to the police station? A Nothing really.
Q. Were you able to go home and go to sleep?
ANo.
Q. You did in fact at that time provide another detailed written
statement; is that right?
9

A. Yes
Q. Did you describe the facts for that detective as you have described

them today?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have Riqo as the person over the front of the car,
shooting?
A On my second statement?
Q. Yes.
A.No.
Q. Why not?
A. Because I was scared.
Q. Again, why were you scared?
A. I was still getting threatening phone calls.
Q. Did you have Riqo in that statement as one of two people who was
shooting?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you have Riqo in the front passenger seat?
A Yes
Q. (Approximately a week later) Did Detective Gent come down and
ask you to give another statement?
A. Yes
Q. In that written statement did you identify Riqo as the person
doing the shooting?
A. Yes
Q. Did Detective Gent ask you why you hadn't identified Riqo in the
first two?
A Yes
Q. What did you tell him?
A That I was scared and I was being threatened
Q. Did you in fact see this defendant come over the top of that red
SUV and fire a gun many times?
A Yes
Pg. 107 (Cross)
Q. And from there you see people get into the car, and then you could
see the people shooting?
A. I seen Riqo shooting.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This appeal arises out of a Petition for Relief under the Post10

Conviction Remedies Act was filed by Petitioner on November

12, 2014,

which was summarily dismissed on January 12, 2015. After the appeal was
filed, a Rule 6o(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment was filed on July 23,
2015 and the request for remand was granted. After remand to the trial

court, the trial court issued a ruling denying the motion.
The Rule 6o(b)(6) motion was premised entirely upon a recantation
of the main witness at trial, Sarah Valencia, who identified Riqo Perea as
the shooter. This recantation, when juxtaposed with the Supreme Court of
Utah's finding on direct appeal of numerous errors in the trial, but denying

~

reversal based upon overwhelming evidence, suggests that the relief from
judgment should be granted in the interest of justice.
An analysis of the Court's decision on direct appeal (State v. Perea,

2013 UT, 322 P.3d 624) suggests that the "overwhelming evidence of guilt"
is premised primarily upon the eyewitness testimony of Sarah Valencia.
While two other individuals testified that Riqo Perea was the shooter, those
two individuals were original suspects in the case, and both were never
-cliarged but testified, thereby calling the- question their bias and reliaoility.
Even more troubling is the fact that several witnesses, including Sarah
Valencia-in he:r recantation affidavit,. claim. that police officers threatened __
and coerced false testimony during the course of the original trial. This
11

~

coercion, if it in fact occurred, would instigate the application of the Due
Process Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions.
Given all of these facts, and the tenuous nature of the testimony relied
on by the Supreme Court of Utah in making a finding of overwhelming
evidence of guilt, the interest of justice request under Rule 6o(b)(6) should
..J

have been granted by the trial court. It is for these reasons that the
petitioner is requesting this Court reverse the trial court and grant the
judgment requested.

1,.;)

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
6o(b)(6) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND
THEREBY VIOLATED HIS STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

Rule 6o(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides relief
from judgment based upon "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." In the case before this Court, significant and
unambiguous evidence that the main witness for the prosecution during the
trial of Mr. Perea testified falsely. This recantation of testimony, combined
with the Supreme Court of Utah's ruling on the direct appeal of the
12

conviction certainly would qualify as "other reason for justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment." Rule 6o(b)(6) is included to prevent a
manifest injustice.
In the case of_Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,r 71, 150 P .3d 480, the
Supreme Court of Utah ruled that the trial court's denial of a Rule 6o(b)(6)
motion was improper due to both the nature of the case (a capital
conviction and sentence) as well as the overwhelming indications of
- injustice. In that case the court held:
Rule 6o(b)(6) is the "catch-all" provision of rule 6o(b). It
providesthat a party may be relievedfrom· ajudgment for "any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 6o(b)(6) (emphasis added). Because
rule 6o(b)(6) is meant to operate as a residuary clause, it may
not be relied upon if the asserted grounds for relief fall within
. any other subsection of rule 6o(b)." See· Cmty. Dental Servs. v.
Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.2002); Russell, 681 P.2d at
1195; Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-07
(Utah 1982). In other words, the grounds for relief under - - - - - - - - \ i . i : ,
6o(b)(6) are exclusive of the grounds for relief allowed under
other subsections. See Russell, 681 P.2d at 1195; Tani, 282 F.3d
at 1168 & n. 8. Furthermore, relief under rule 6o(b)( 6) is meant
to be the exception rather than the rule; we have previously held
that it should be "sparingly invoked" and used "only in unusual
and exceptional circumstances." Laub, 657 P.2d at 1307-08
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pioneer Inv. Servs.
Co. v. BrunswickAssocs., 507 U.S. 380,393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123
L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (remarking that under rule 6o(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must show
"extraordinary circumstances"); Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168 (same).
In the case of Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ,r 14, 285 P.3d 1133, 1137 that
13

while relief under Rule (b)(6) is to be sparingly invoked by the court only in
unusual and exceptional circumstances, the Court held:
,i 14 Mr. Kell did not specify which of rule 6o(b)'s subsections he

relied upon, but his sole argument was that his postconviction
attorneys were grossly negligent in representing him and
provided him ineffective assistance. This claim does not fall
within any of the five specified subsections of rule 6o(b). In
Menzies v. Galetka, we determined that Mr. Menzies' ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fell under the province of subsection
(b)(6). 11 Following that precedent, we treat Mr. Kell's motion as
one for relief under subsection (b)(6). Rule 6o(b)(6) imposes a
temporal restriction, albeit an imprecise one, requiring that the
motion be brought within a "reasonable time."
In the case at bar, there can be little dispute that the fact that the State's
main witness committed perjury does not fit within the (b)(1) mistake,
(b)(2) newly discovered evidence, or (b)(3) fraud by opposing party reasons
of Rule 6o(b). Here we have a witness under threat from the police, who
_,J

testifies falsely. Furthermore, there can be little dispute that the motion and
memorandum, filed a mere 21 days later was "filed within a reasonable
time" of the discovery of said perjury. The trial court acknowledged the
timeliness of the filing in finding,
However, to the extent Petitioner's motion is more properly
submitted under rule 6o(b)(6), the court concludes the
motion is timely.' A motion under rule 6o(b)(6) must be filed
within a "reasonable time." Petitioner filed the motion only
three weeks after learning of Ms. Valencia's allegations, which
is a reasonable time under the rule. (See Ruling and Order on
Petitioner's motion for Relief from Judgment entered on
October 16, 2015)
14
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In the case of Bish Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359,
·····- - -· . - . - ··•· . '<..,

359 P.2d 21, 22 (1961) the Supreme Court of Utah recognized a due process
component to Rule 6o(b)([6])1 language of "any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment." In that case, the court held:
The aggrieved party under such a showing would be entitled to
relief from the judgment of the district court under subdivision
(7) of Rule 6o(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure even after the
expiration of three months because relief from a judgment on
account of a lack of due process of law is not expressly
provided forliy such rule. --- . -..... -- . - . - . .. -.. -•- ··-.
One of the most troubling portions of the recantation statement by
Sarah Valencia's the fact that the investigating officers, and apparently the
prosecution's investigator were told multiple times that Sarah could not see
the shooter, and yet were told to testify falsely at the trial. The relevant
portion of Sarah Valencia's statement is as follows:
8. I told the detectives that I could not see the occupants of the car that I
coulan-!.t:-see-their faces, but the officer-insisted-that it was Riqo and
Bubba (Marquis Lucero). I informed the police that he couldn't have
been Bubba because I didn't see him there that night.
9. Approximately a month or so after the shooting, I was again
questioned by the police and I overheard the officers talked about the
Rule 6o(b)(7) of the 1961 Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to the
current Rule 6o(b}(§).
1
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fact that Sabrina was running toward the garage and was shot in the
chest and therefore there may have been a shooter in the garage area.
I asked the officers about this fact, and they told me that although the
CSI and found some bullets there, that they didn't believe that
happened. I was confused and scared, and therefore I went along with
what the officers told me to say.

v;

10.

I also recall that prior to the trial occurring I was asked to meet
at the prosecutor's office on 24th and Washington and they showed
me maps and again told me what to say in trial. Again I was scared

and worried about my child and therefore went along with what they
told me to testify about.
In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766,
~

.. -

31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). the Supreme.Court.of-the United States held that a
prosecutor who allows false testimony be introduced at trial even with
regards to credibility has violated the due process rights of a criminal
defendant. In that case the court held
As long ago as Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S.Ct.
340, 342, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935), this Court made clear that
deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation
of known false evidence is incompatible with 'rudimentary
demands of justice.' This was reaffirmed in Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942). In Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), we said,
'(t)he same result obtains when the State, although not
16

soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it
appears.' Id., at 269, 79 S.Ct., at 1177. Thereafter Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S., at 87, 83 S.Ct., at 1197, held that
suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial
'irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.'
See American *154 Bar Association, Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and the Defense
· ··Functions 3.·11.(a). When the.'reliability of a·given witness may·
well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of
evidence- affecting credibility falls within this general rule.
Napue, supra, at 269, 79 S.Ct., at 1177.
Under our unique state constitution, public prosecutors fall under the
judicial branch of government. (See Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, §
16). This placement of prosecutors in the judicial branch is appropriate, as
our law recognizes that prosecutors are ministers ofjustice who must
steadfastly "eschew all improper tactics." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ,I
31, 992 P .2d 951.
[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor---indeed, he-should do so. But, while-he may strike hard blows, he - - - - is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one. (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah
1992))
Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
17

While the petitioner recognizes that there is no direct evidence the
prosecutor knew the testimony of Sarah Valencia was both coerced and
false, the fact that the police officers and the prosecutor's investigator
allowed her to testify as she did triggers the same due process concerns.
The Supreme Court of Utah and the Supreme Court of the United
States have both recognized that outrageous governmental misconduct may
so offend due process of law that the government is '"absolutely barred
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction."' State v. Colonna,
766 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Utah 1988), quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 431-32 (1973). The Colonna court tacitly recognized that extreme
'\!!)

governmental misconduct that shocks the conscience or is '"repugnant to
the American criminal justice system"' may violate the Due Process Clauses

,..:J

of the Utah and Federal Constitutions. Colonna, 766 P .2d at 1066, quoting

Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971). The United
States Supreme Court recognized that Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment might be violated by outrageous government misconduct that
violates "fundamental 'canons of decency and fairness.'" United States v.
*

+

4

+

Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (1980). _I~ County of Sacr~mento v. Le71!is,
523 U.S. 833, 836, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1711 (1998), the Court held, "In a due
process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the
18

behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it
may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Rochin v.
CaliforrLia, 342 U.S_. 165, 172-74 (1952), exemplifies w:hen that standard _
may be met. The Rochin Court recognized that police conduct in seeking to
retrieve drugs swallowed by a suspect by squeezing and reaching down his
throat, and then taking him to a hospital where a tube was forced down his
throat to deliver an emetic inducing him to vomit the drugs he had
swallowed, shocked the conscience and violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Any lawyer's presentation or failure to correct false evidence is
accurately viewed as a fraud upon the court. See, e.g., Hurst v. Cook, 777
P.2d 1029, 1036 n.6 (Utah 1989). The prosecution (which would include
the prosecutor's investigator and by extension the investigating officers)
clearly may not present evidence or advance arguments lmown to be untrue=-----~
or likely to leave false impressions. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 656 P.2d
450, 454 (Utah 1982) (State duty-bound by law and professional ethics to
treat defendant fairly and may not assert arguments lmown to be
inaccurate); Walker v. State, 624 P .2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (State's
reliance on false impressions created by testimony constituted
prosecutorial misconduct analogous to use of false testimony). Indeed, the
19

knowing use of misleading or false testimony by the prosecution, or the
failure to correct such testimony, violates a defendant's federal and state
rights to due process. Accord Evans v. Virginia, 471 U.S. 1025, 1027-28
(1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957).
Constitutional errors normally cast upon the prosecution the duty to prove
them harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d
916, 922 (Utah App. 1995); Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1160 (10th Cir.
2003); United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir. 1989). A
conviction obtained by the knowing use of false or misleading evidence is
fundamentally unfair and must be set aside if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury.

E.g.Napue.
When a prosecution obtains a criminal conviction through a knowing
presentation or failure to correct false evidence, both the State and Federal
constitutions are violated. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; U.S. Const Amend.
XIV; State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 and nn. 1-2 (Utah 1984). Due process
simply "cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing
use of false evidence." Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). The Utah
Supreme Court has aptly explained:
20

It is an accepted premise in American jurisprudence that any
conviction obtained by the knowing use of false testimony is
fundamentally unfair and totally incompatible with "rudimentary
demands of justice." The proposition is firmly established that a
conviction obtained through the use of false evidence known to
be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,
Section 7, of the Utah State Constitution, if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury. The same result obtains when the State,
although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected
when it appears. This standard derives from both the
prosecutorial misconduct and more importantly the fact that the
use of false evidence involves a corruption ofthe truth seeking
· ·· · · · function·ofthetrial process~- · -- · --- ·- - ·
· ----- · -

In the present case we have situation wherein there is evidence that
the police threatened one of the Prosecution's main witnesses with the
taking of her child if she did not testify in accordance with their wishes.
. According to the affidavit of Sarah.Valencia, in a meeting with the _____ . __
prosecutor's investigator and the police several weeks prior to trial she was
informed of the same. Actions by the police of this nature would certainly
invoke the protections of the due process clause of the 14th amendment.
The failure the prosecution to rein in such actions by the police would
invoke similar constitutional violations.
.. The Supreme Court of Utah has r.ecognized not.only the due proc~ss __
implications of the police threatening a witness but also recognize the Utah
21

constitutional protections under Article VIII Section 3 which would allow
-~

due process type actions to be under the prerogative of the Supreme Court
of Utah. In the case of Gardner v. Galetka,

-.d

2007 UT

3, ,I 20, 151 P.3d 968,

972-73 the Court ruled it would be appropriate for the court under the Utah

constitutional provisions to allow a Rule 6o(b) motion to be addressed even
if it could be potentially barred under some statute of limitation. In that
.. case the·coiirfheld:

J

We noted that "the power to review post-conviction petitions
'quintessentially ... belongs to the judicial branch of
government' pursuant to article VIII of the Utah
Constitution."38 As such, "the legislature may not impose
restrictions which limit [post-conviction relief] as a judicial rule
of procedure, except as provided in the constitution."39 We
concluded, "Our state constitution is designed to prevent the
unlawful, improper incarceration or execution ofinnc>'cent ·
individuals, and for that reason, we uphold the viability of the
Hurst 'good cause' exceptions."4° As a result, it is possible for a
successive post-conviction claim to be procedurally barred
under the PCRA and yet receive substantive review on its merits
under our independent "good cause" common law exceptions.
In State v. Williams,

2012

UT App

119, ,I

4, 276 P.3d

1265,

the Utah

Court of Appeals did apply limitations to posttrial recantation evidence,
ruling;
The granting of a new trial based on posttrial recantation
evidence is appropriate only upon a determination that "the
substance of the proffered [recantation] testimony" and the
·"testimony's probable· ·weight" would "make a different result
probable on retrial." See State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, ,I 18, 994
22

P.2d 1237 {internal quotation marks omitted}. The credibility of
the recantation evidence is "an essential component" of this
... deteimiriatiori~See·state i,~ 'J>irider, 2005· UT'is, ,r 'i'i6, ·114·-P.3d . - - -·· -·
551;

In the case at bar, we have an unusually exceptional circumstance
which justifies the application of Rule 6o(b)(6) and the granting of a new
trial. Here, we have a case in which a 19-year-old individual has been
sentenced to prison for two consecutive life terms without the possibility of
parole. Furthermore, this is a case in which there is a high probability that
the defendant was improperly convicted. On direct appeal, the Supreme
Court of Utah ruled that there were several errors made by the trial court
including an improper exclusion of expert testimony that would suggest
that due to lighting conditions an individual would not be able to see from
the location of Sarah Valencia any facial features or distinguishing
appearance of an individual shooting from a vehicle on the roadway. The
expert generated animations, and the accompanying testimony suggested
an alternate theory of the shooting. The improper exclusion of expert
testimony regarding false confessions, and the improper exclusion of other
testimony and documents presented by the defendant all support of the
defendants theory that he was not the shooter. The Court concluded that
these errors were harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. In
23
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relying upon this harmless error theory, the court weighed heavily the
testimony of Sarah Valencia, who was the only independent eye-witness in
the case to put the gun in the hand of Riqo Perea. The other witnesses,
Angelo Gallegos and Christopher Garcia were both potential defendants

vJ>

were never charged as a result of their testimony, and therefore as such had
some inherent reliability issues. The only other eyewitness put a gun in the
hand of Riqo Perea was Dominique Duran, but her testimony was likewise
inherently unreliable based upon the fact that she testified she didn't
remember much, and that questioning prosecutor's recitation of one of her
prior three contradictory statements was qualified by a statement as
follows~·
Q. Do you remember during the course of this statement
Detective John Thomas, who's seated right here in the
courtroom, coming to you and emphasizing that it was
important for you to tell the truth?
.
,vJ> . ..

-· .

A Yes. He threatened me a lot, yes.

--Thus, we have a situation wherein the overwhelming evidence -relied upon
by the Supreme Court of Utah is significantly undermined by the
recantation by Sarah Valencia for trial testimony. It is the testimony of
Sarah Valencia-that constituted· the overwhelming evidence relied-upon by··
the Utah Supreme Court in denying a new trial. Utilizing the requirement
24

that "[t]he credibility of the recantation evidence is 'an essential
component' of this determination"2, an analysis of that recantation would
suggest reliability of the recantation. Here, we see that Ms. Valencia
originally told the police three times that she could not recognize the
shooter, and only after coercion did she change that story. Her original
statements would be supported by the defense expert who said that due to
lighting conditions..one would not be able to see sufficiently to recognize an
individual in the shooter's position.
Given all of the above, there is a significant likelihood that the
outcome of the trj.al would be different if the original trial testimony of
Sarah Valencia is shown to be false. This likelihood would increase even
more if the original trial court errors excluding significant defense evidence
. . ... were rectified.at .the.new trial.
Arti~le VII! Section 3 of the Ut~ ~011~tution :Qrovides the Supre.Ill~ __
Court authority to issue writs and orders to ensure that an individual is not
unjustly incarcerated. Given the information contained in Sarah Valencia's
affidavit in which she recants the entirety of her eyewitness identification,
the conviction of Riqo Perea is seriously called into question. A granting of
the petitioner's request for new trial would ensure that justice is

2

State v.-Williams, 2012 UT App 119; ,r 4, 276-P.3d 1265
25
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accomplished, and that Mr. Perea's constitutional rights are adequately
protected.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the petitioner respectfully requests this
court to grant relief from judgment in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
Petition. In the alternative, the petitioner respectfully requests that the case
be remanded for an evidentiacy hearing on the Rule 6o(b) motion.

DATED this 4th day of February 2016.

-..a ...
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JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

11

Rigo Perea appeals from a conviction for two counts of
aggravated murder in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-202 and
two counts of attempted murder in violation of Utah Code section
76-5-203. Mr. Perea was sentenced to life ·without parole (L \VOP) for
each aggravated murder conviction and three years lo life for each
attempted murder conviction.

STATE

JUSTICE PARRISH,

v.

PEREA

opinion of the Court

i12

Mr. Perea raises numerous issues. He contends that the
district court erred by limiting and excluding the testimony of
defense experts, precluding the testimony of potentially exculpatory
defense witnesses, and denying Mr. Perea' s motion to suppress his
confession. Mr. Perea further contends that the combination of
errors constitutes cumulative error and requires reversal. Mr. Perea
also argues that Utah Code section 76-3-207.7, which provides the
sentencing scheme for first degree felony aggravated murder, is
unconstitutional. He finally argues that we should require recording
of confessions occurring at police stations.

13

We hold that the district court erred when it excluded the
testimony of the defense's expert witnesses. But we conclude that
the error was harmless and does not undermine our confidence in
the verdict when viewed against the backdrop of Mr. Perea' s
ovenvhelming guilt. \'Ve also hold that section 76-3-207.7 is constitutional on its face and was constitutionally applied to Mr. Perea. \Ve
therefore affirm.

,4

BACKGROUND

On the evening of August 4, 2007, Mr. Perea, then nineteen
years old, was spending time with friends. Mr. Perea and many of
those with him belonged to the Ogden Trece gang. That night,
Dominique Duran drove the group to the home of Christina Rivera
in her maroon GMC Yukon (SUV). When the group arrived at
Ms.Rivera's residence, Sarah Valencia, who had been left in charge
of the :residence, told the group they were not welcome.

15

When the group entered Ms. Rivera's house over
Ms. Valencia's objections, she and a friend walked across the street
to Anthony Nava's house. Mr. Nava was hosting a wedding party
that included some members of the Norteftos, a rival gang to the
Ogden Trece. Before Ms. Valencia and her friend made it to
Mr. Nava' s house, Mr. Perea and the others followed them and an
argument erupted. The argument led to an exchange of gang insults
between Mr. Perea' s group and some party goers at Mr. Nava' s, at
which point an unknown person fired a shot in the air.
~6

When the shot was fired, Mr. Perea and his group returned
to Ms. Duran's SUV. Mr. Perea was seated in the front passenger
seat. Ms. Valencia, who was standing near the street, testified that
as the SUV pulled away, "I seen Riqo over the top, shooting."
Similarly, Angelo Gallegos and Elias Garcia, passengers in the SUV,
testified that Mr. Perea fired shots from the SUV as it pulled away
from the party.
2
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17

iv1s. Valencia and her friend, Sabrina Prieto, were standing

on a walkway between the front door and the carport of Mr. Nava' s
house when the shots rang out from the SUV. Ms. Valencia ran east
along the front of the home toward the carport, and as she sought
cover in a side door, she turned and saw Ms. Prieto fall on the
doorstep. Ms. Prieto had been fatal1y shot through the right side of
her chest.

,s

Richard Esquivel, like many of the other witnesses, was
facing the road when the shots from the SUV were fired.
Mr. Esquivel testified that he saw someone from the passenger side
of the SUV lean over the roof and fire towards Mr. Nava' s house.
After the first shot was fired, Mr. Esquivel got down but was hit in
the back part of his shoulder and hip. Rocendo Nevarez, who was
standing slightly closer to the road, was fatally shot in the lower left
part of his back.
~9
Keri Garcia was standing in 1Vlr. Nava' s driveway when the
shots from the SUV were fired. She ran south along the side of the
house, but was shot in the lm,ver back as she sought cover.
Ms. Garcia testified that the shots came only from the direction of the
road.

,10 Lacey Randall \.Vas standing beside her car, which was
parked in 1vlr. Nava's driveway. As did the other wil11esses,
Ms. Randall testified that she saw the shooter sitting on the passenger side windowsill of the SUV. Ms. Randall was pulled to the
ground just before a bullet struck the car window above her.
111 ivfr. Gallegos, a passenger in the SUV, testified that when
Mr. Perea climbed back into the vehicle after the shootings,
Mr. Perea told them that "[i]f [they] said anything, there would be
a bullet with [their] name on it." In contrast, :tvlr. Garcia, another
passenger, testified that Mr. Perea ''was confused," but ''never
threatened to put a bullet in anybody." Ms. Duran, who was
driving, testified that Mr. Perea said," (D]rive right and let's not get
pulled over."
~12 A short time later, Ms. Duran dropped off the group near
a church in North Ogden. Mr. Garcia testified that later that
morning, Mr. Perea dumped the gun in an alley. The gun was never
recovered.

~13 The bullets recovered from Ms. Prieto' sand Mr. Navarez' s
bodies were .22 caliber and appeared to have been fired from the
same gun. Police recovered ten expended .22 caliber shell casings in

.,
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the street in front of Mr. Nava' s house. No other shell casings were
found at the crime scene. While the State's ballistic expert determined that all of the casings were expended from the same gun, the
expert was not able to determine if the gun that fired the bullets was
the same gun that expended the casings.

il14 \.Vhile investigating the case, Detective John Thomas called
Mr. Perea' s cell phone. Detective Thomas explained that he needed
Mr. Perea "to come into the police station, talk to [him]," and give
the detective "[Mr. Perea's] version of what happened that night."
Mr. Perea denied any involvement in the crime and then disconnected the call. When Detective Thomas called back, Mr. Perea
stated that "he wasn't coming in yet, that he needed to speak with
his lawyer first before he came in," and that "he got screwed the last
time he spoke with cops and he was innocent."

i11s

Two days later, officers arrested Mr. Perea in Layton. They
transported Mr. Perea back to Ogden and placed him in an interview
room. Mr. Perea was allowed to use the bathroom, and when he
returned, Detective Thomas read Mr. Perea his Miranda rights.
Detective Thomas joked that Mr. Perea ''had his rights read to him
so many times that he could probably read them back to [him], and
[Mr. Perea] kind of laughed and said, 'Yeah, probably."' Officer
Gent, who was standing outside the interview room, monitored the
conversation via a closed-circuit television. Despite the fact that the
closed-circuit television was equipped to do so, Officer Gent did not
record the interview because it was the Ogden Police Department's
policy not to record interrogations.
~16 After providing Mr. Perea with some water, Detective
Thomas and Officer Gent began their questioning. Mr. Perea agreed
to speak \vith the investigators and told them his version of the
events the night of the shootings. Though the investigators told Mr.
Perea that his story did not match that of other witnesses, the
conversation remained calm and civil.
'TI17 During the questioning, the investigators suggested that
perhaps Mr. Perea fired the shots from the SUV because he was
trying to protect Ms. Duran's children, who were in the back seat of
the SUV. And in an attempt "to minimize the consequences of what
[Mr. Perea] was looking at," Officer Gent suggested to Mr. Perea that
he intentionally shot low or high, not intending to kill anyone.
During this part of the questioning, Mr. Perea began to cry and
though "he was tearing up and his eyes were welling up," Officer
Gent testified that "it wasn't like [Mr. Perea] \.\'as full grown dis4
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traught." \Vhen further questioned about whether he shot to protect
the children, Mr. Perea stated that" as they drove off [in the SUV] he
blacked out and he couldn't remember what happened."
,I18 The investigators told Mr. Perea that "it doesn't usually
work out well'' when people say they blacked out, and they
encouraged Mr. Perea to tell the truth. Mr. Perea thereafter admitted
to shooting from the SUV. \Vhen asked what kind of gun he fired,
Mr. Perea stated that it was a .22 caliber, a fact the investigators had
not previously disclosed.

if 19 After admitting to the shooting, Nlr. Perea agreed to sign
a typewritten confession. Officer Gent once again gave Mr. Perea a
Miranda warning, and Mr. Perea again agreed to speak with the
officers. Officer Gent then asked Mr. Perea open-ended questions
about the shooting, to which Mr. Perea gave answers that "seemed
appropriate for the question." Officer Gent testified that he transcribed l\llr. Perea' s statements u verbatim."

~po After Officer Gent completed the transcription, he printed
the document and handed it to Mr. Perea for review. vVhen Officer
Gent asked Mr. Perea if he could read, ''[Mr. Perea] laughed at [the
officer] and said he could." Mr. Perea read the statement and signed
where appropriate, including an acknowledgment that he voluntarily waived his lv1iranda rights. Officer Gent testified that he
"[n]ever saw any indication that [Mr. Perea] was not understanding
what [the investigators] ·were saying" and that Mr. Perea was
attentive and responsive throughout the process. Officer Gent
further testified that he never made any promises to Mr. Perea in
exchange for his cooperation with the investigators.
,I21 The State charged Mr. Perea with two counts of aggravated
murder and two counts of attempted murder. The State initially
filed, and then withdrew, a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
Prior to trial, the district court made three substantive evidentiary
rulings relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
Cff22 First, the district court denied the State's motion to exclude
the testimony of James Gas kilt the defense's crime scene recons truction expert, who intended to testify that there were multiple shooters
and that the State's conclusion that Mr. Perea fired all of the shots
was not supported by the forensic evidence. The State argued that
Nlr. Gaskill's theories were not supported by the facts and that his
anticipated testimony constituted an improper expression of opinion
on the credibility of other witnesses. The district court held that
Mr .Gaskill could testify regarding his conclusions about the
5
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sequence of events on the night of the crime. And while the district
court ruled that Mr. Gaskill could not comment on the credibility of
other witnesses, it allowed him to" testify that based on his examination[,] he [did not] agree with what some of the witnesses testified
to."
~23 Minutes before the defense presented its case, the State
renewed its motion to exclude Mr. Gaskill's testimony. Citing
foundational concerns, the State objected to the admission of two
computer animations and a number of photographs Mr. Gaskill
intended to use in support of his testimony. After hearing testimony
from Mr. Gaskill in support of the evidentiary foundation, the court
excluded both animations and the photographic evidence. It ruled
that the photographs did not accurately depict the crime scene and
it excluded the animation because "[Mr.] Gaskill can't lay any kind
of a foundation for the animation here. He didn't prepare it. We
don't know what went into it. We don't know who was involved in
[its creation]." Although the court allowed Mr. Gaskill to testify at
trial regarding his theories, it sustained the majority of the State's
multiple objections when Mr. Gaski11' s testimony commented
directly on the credibility of other witnesses.
,24 The district court's second relevant pretrial ruling involved
the testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe, a defense expert who intended
to testify about the phenomena of false confessions and opine that
Mr. Perea had falsely confessed. The State argued that under rule
608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Dr. Ofshe could not testify "that
[Mr. Perea' s] confession was coerced" because "[t]hat is a legal
conclusion ... [a]nd that is for the [district court] to determine." The
State also argued that under rule 702, Dr. Ofshe's "research is
sharply contested ... [and] is not research that is generally accepted
within the scientific community in which he operates." Finally, the
State argued that under rule 403, Dr. Ofshe' s testimony would be
more prejudicial than probative.

125 The defense responded by noting that the parties were not
before the court" on a Rimmasch hearing" and argued that the district
court had "appointed [Dr. Ofshe] as an expert." The defense
continued, stating that "[w]e're asking that [Dr. Ofshe] be able to
testify as an expert and ask for some sort of Rimmasch [hearing] that
could show that he's not reliable,'' otherwise, "I think that it would
be incumbent upon the Court to allow his testimony." The defense
argued that Dr. Ofshe had testified in over one hundred cases
nationwide, that this court had cited to Dr. Ofshe's work in two

6
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opinions, 1 and that his expert testimony would assist the jury and
should therefore be admitted.
126 The district court reasoned that a jury of lay people could
determine a confession's voluntariness. It also expressed concern
that it
ha[ d] previously ruled that Defendant's confession
was voluntary. Dr. Ofshe' s proposed testimony that
Defendant's [confession] was coerced isa legal conclusion previously rejected by the Court and invades the
fact finding function of the jury. . . . [Further,]
Dr. Ofshe's conclusions do not meet the Rimmasch
standard because they are based upon principles not
generally accepted within the scientific community.
The district court did not "allow Dr. Ofshe to testify either in
generalities about coerced confessions or about the confession in this
particular case." The district court noted, however, that" the defense
[could] develop their theory of whether it was a coerced confession
in the[ir] argument," and it agreed to give a jury instruction
regarding coerced confessions.
127 The district court's third relevant pretrial ruling involved
its decision to bar potential defense witnesses unless the defense
disclosed their names. The defense argued that anonymity was
critical because these potentially exculpatory witnesses would not
come forward, or would change their stories, if their names were
revealed outside of the courtroom. The State argued that such a
prohibition would prevent proper investigation of the witnesses'
stories. The district court ruled that "if these [witnesses] are not
willing to give their identity to the prosecutors and the law enforcement [to] follow up on what they are going to say, then they are not
going to testify." After the court's ruling, the defense chose not to
disclose the names of the potential witnesses and did not call them
at trial.
,i2s The jury found Mr. Perea guilty as charged. At the
sentencing hearing, the district court identified several aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, and found that "the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt." It sentenced Mr. Perea to LWOP for each

See State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ~ ~I 22-23, 31, 984 P.2d 1009;
State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ~,r 21, 27 n.3, 53-54, 56, 67 P.3d 477.
1
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aggravated murder count and three years to life for each attempted
murder count. I\fr. Perea timely appealed.
~29 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3102(3)(i).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
~30 \Ve review the district court's decision to exclude expert
witness testimony for an abuse of discretion. Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson
v. Davis Hosp. [-,, Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ~ 5, 242 P.3d 762; State v.
Clopte11, 2009 UT 84, , 6, 223 P.3d 1103. The district court has "wide
discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony."
Staf-e v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, if 66, 44 P.3d 794 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Therefore, "we disturb the district court's decision
to strike expert testimony only when it exceeds the limits of
reasonability." Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, ~ 5 (internal quotation marks
omitted). But if the district court errs in its interpretation of the law
or the application of the law to the facts," it [does] not act within the
limits of reasonability, and we will not defer to the evidentiary
decision." Id.
iJ31 Similarly, we give the district court "broad discretion to
admit or exclude evidence," including lay witness testimony, and
will disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion." Daines v.
Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ~ 21, 190 P.3d 1269; sec al~o Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400,415 (1988) (affirming the trial court's preclusion of witness
testimony as a sanction for a discovery violation).
11

,32 A district court's "ruling on a motion to suppress is
reviewed for correctness, including its application of the law to the
facts." State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ,I 23,227 P.3d 1251. We review the
district court's factual findings for dear error. Save Our Schools v. Bd.
c:f Educ., 2005 UT 55, ~ 9, 122 P.3d 611. We will only find clear error
if the court's factual findings "are not adequately supported by the
record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court's determination." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).

i\33

1\fr. Perea' s cumulative error claim requires that vve first
apply "the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim
of error." Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, ~ 4, 172 P.3d
668. After assessing Mr. Perea's underlying claims, we will reverse
"under the cumulative error doctrine only if the cumulative effect of
the several errors undermines ... confidence that a fair trial was
had." State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, , 54, 191 P.3d 17 (internal
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quotation marks omitted). But, if Mr. Perea' s claims do not constitute error, or if the cumulative effect of any errors does not undermine our confidence in the verdict, we will not apply the doctrine.
See id.
134 Mr. Perea' s challenge to his sentence of LWOP involves
statutory and constitutional interpretation. We therefore review the
district court's decision "for correctness, and we provide no
deference to the district court's legal conclusions." State v. Poole,
2010 UT 25,

CU

8, 232 P.3d 519.

ANALYSIS
,35 I\,fr. Perea argues that the district court erred in:
(1) limiting the testimony of the defense's crime scene reconstruction
expert, (2) excluding the testimony of the defense's false confession
expert, (3) precluding the testimony of potentially exculpatory
witnesses, and (4) denying the defense's motion to suppress
Mr. Perea's confession. Mr. Perea argues that, taken together, these
errors constituted cumulative error and "effectively den[ied]
Mr. Perea a fair trial.'' Mr. Perea further argues that his sentence of
LWOP is unconstitutional. Finally, Mr. Perea urges us to judicially
require the recording of all station house confessions.

if 36 We first address each of Mr. Perea' s asserted errors and
then turn to his cumulative error argument.

vVe next discuss

Mr .Perea' s argument that his sentence of LWOP is unconstitutional.

Finally, we turn to Mr. Perea's argument that we should judicially
mandate the recording of station house confessions.

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN LIMITING THE
TESTIMONY OF JAMES GASKILL
Mr. Perea argues that the district court erroneously
excluded the testimony of James Gaskill, the defense expert on crime
scene reconstruction. Mr. Gaskill visited the scene, took measurements, and determined that there "were multiple shooters[,] ... that
the bullet casing pattern did not seem consistent with the State's
version of events, [and] that it would be difficult, if not impossible,
for [Mr. Perea] to hit the[] victims according to the State's theory."
While the district court allowed Mr. Gaskill to testify to his investigation and theory, it did not allow him to directly comment on the
credibility of the State's witnesses, or utilize photographic and
animated evidence in support of his testimony.
if37

138 We hold that the district court did not err when it prevented Mr. Gaskill from commenting on the veracity of other
9
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witnesses and when it refused to admit his proffered photographs.
But the district court did abuse its discretion when it refused to
admit the computer animations in support of Mr. Gaskill' s testimony.

A. The District Court Did not Err when It Precluded Mr. Gaskill From
Directly Commenting on the Credibility of the State's Witnesses

,f 39 "[W]e allow experts latitude to interpret the facts before
them," even when that interpretation contradicts that of another
witness. Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & lv1ed. Ctr., 2010 UT
.59, 116,242 P.3d 762. But we do not allow ''an expert's testimony
as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion." State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388,392 (Utah 1989) (citing rule 608 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence for the proposition that witnesses may not
normally testify regarding" specific instances of [another] witness's
conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for
truthfulness"). Because "the resolution of credibility [is] for the fact
finder [alone],'' it is not a proper subject on which an expert witness
may opine. State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204,211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

,r 40 While our rules of evidence allow Mr. Gaskill to present
theories that contradicted the testimony of other witnesses, our rules
do not allow him to comment directly on the veracity of those
witnesses. See Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, il 17. We therefore hold that the
district court did not err when it prohibited Mr. Gaskill from
testifying as to the truthfulness of the State's witnesses.
B. The District Court Did not Err when It Excluded Mr. Gaskill's
Crime Scene Photographs

,I 41 Before evidence may be admitted, its proponent is required
to establish a proper foundation. Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence requires that evidence must be relevant to be admitted.
Rule 901(a) requires that an exhibit must be authenticated and that
"the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is." Where an
exhibit is not representative of what its proponent claims it represents, a court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to admit
the exhibit. See State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). And even if an exhibit is both relevant and authenticated, rule
403 allows the district court to exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially ouh-veighed by a danger of one or
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence."
O
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Here, the defense sought to introduce photographs taken
by Mr. Gaskill that he claimed represented the crime scene. The
State objected, arguing that the photographs did not accurately
represent the scene on the night of the shooting. Though the
photographs were based on actual crime scene photographs,
Mr. Gaskill admitted that there were many differences between his
photographs and the scene on the night of the shooting. He
admitted that the photos purporting to show Mr. Perea' s view from
the SUV could not be accurate because the appropriate make and
model SUV was not used. He further admitted that a pickup truck
in one of the photographs was not the same make or model as the
truck parked there on the night of the shooting. Finally, Mr. Gaskill
admitted that he was not certain if a car in one of the photographs
was in the same location as it had been on the night of the shooting.
,42

~43 Mr. Gaskill' s admissions create significant doubt as to the
accuracy and relevance of the photographs. Particularly where the
defense's theory was contingent on the location and size of the
vehicles involved, the inaccurate use of substitute vehicles had the
potential to unfairly prejudice or mislead the jury or to confuse the
issues. See UTAH R. EVID. 403. Therefore, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it refused to admit the inaccurate and
potentially misleading photographs.
C. The District Court Erred wizen It Excluded lvlr. Gaskill's

Computer-Generated Animations
,I44 The defense attempted to introduce two computergenerated animations to visually represent Mr. Gaskill's testimony.
Mr. Gaskill testified that although he did not personally create the
animations, they ''g[a]ve an indication of what [he] believe[d] may
have happened" and would make it easier for the jury to understand
his testimony. The State objected and the district court refused to
admit the animations, finding that" there [was] no foundation for the
animation[s]" because Mr. Gaskill did not know "who created
[them]," "the background of the people who created [them]," "how
[they were] created," or ''what [the animators] relied upon in
creating [them]." We hold that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in refusing to admit the animations.
~45 Broadly speaking, all evidence can be categorized as either
substantive or demonstrative. See Steven C. Marks, The Admissibility
and Use of Demonstrative Aids., 32 A.B.A. THE BRIEF 24, 25 (2003).
Demonstrative evidence is evidence that is meant only to illustrate
a witness's testimony. Id. It carries no independent probative value
11
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in and of itself, but aids a jury in understanding difficult factual
issues. Id. Common examples of demonstrative evidence include
models, charts, and tirnelines.

,r 46 On the other hand, substantive evidence is" offered to help
establish a fact in issue." BLACK'S LAW DICrJONARY 640 (9th ed.
2009). In other words, relevant "[substantive] evidence directly
affects the perceived likelihood that a fact of consequence has
occurred" whereas the ''effect of demonstrative evidence is to help
clarify and make more understandable a piece of substantive proof."
Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance uf
.,
Demonstrative Evidence: Charting Its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 957., 967 (1992). Common examples of substantive
evidence include eyewitness testimony, ballistic reports, and
security camera footage.
if47 Because rule 901(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires
that "the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is/' the
distinction between substantive and demonstrative evidence is
critical to understanding the foundational burden imposed on the
evidence's proponent. If the evidence is merely demonstrative, then
the proponent claims only that the proffered demonstrative evidence
accurately illustrates the testimony given and rule 901 is satisfied so
long as there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that it
accurately depicts a witness's testimony as well as any uncontested
relevant facts. 2 Alternatively, in the case of substantive evidence,
there must be some showing that the evidence itself supports the
proffered conclusion. 3
~48 Computr:'.r-generated evidence is simply a subset of general
evidence and the categories of computer-generated evidence
correspond with the h-vo general categories of evidence. A "com-

Prior cases have held that demonstrations and reenactments
require substantially similar conditions, See, e.g., Whitehead v. Am.
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990). This substantial
similarity requirement is properly applied to the undisputed facts and
proponent's own testimony. \Ne have never held that such evidence
must be substantially similar to the opponent's version of disputed
2

facts.
The type of support required will vary depending on the nature
of the substantive evidence. See R. COLLIN MANGRUM & DEE
BENSON, MANGRUM& BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE, 802-23 (2012).
3
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puter animation" demonstrates a witness's testimony and is
therefore a subset of demonstrative evidence. See Kurtis A. Kemper,
Annotation,AdmissibilityofComputer-GcncratedAnimation, 111 A.LR.
5th 529 § 2b (2003). As such, the witness does not use the computer
animation to arrive at his or her conclusions. Rather, the animation
is wholly illustrative of the witness's own conclusions drawn from
the underlying substantive evidence.

,J49 In contrast, a "computer simulation" is substantive
evidence used by the witness in drawing his conclusions.
(C]omputer-generated simulations are typically
recreations of events or experiments based on scientific principles and data; in a simulation, data is
entered into a computer, which is programmed to
analyze and draw conclusions from the data. Computer simulations are [therefore a type of] substantive
evidence offered to support a fact in issue and have
independent evidentiary value.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Computer simulations do not just illustrate
an expert's conclusions but are submitted as substantive evidence
with independent probative value. As a subset of substantive
evidence, computer simulations must therefore meet a higher
threshold showing than that required for demonstrative evidence.

cif50 Because computer animations are merely a subset of
demonstrative evidence, it is not necessary that the testifying witness
know how the animation was created in order to satisfy rule 901's
authenticity requirement. Rather, it is sufficient that the animation
accurately reflects the witness's testimony. See, e.g., Gosser v.
Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 897, 903 (Ky. 2000) ("(B]ecause a
computer-generated diagram, like any diagram, is merely illustrative of a witness's testimony, its admission normally does not
depend on testimony as to how the diagram was prepared, e.g., how
the data was gathered or inputted into the computer."), al1rogated on
other grounds by Eleryv. Commonwealtll, 368S.W.3d 78 (Ky. 2012). For
instance, an expert witness using a plastic model of a human organ
is not required to know how the model was created. It is sufficient
for the expert to confirm that the model accurately represents the
organ about which he is testifying. 4

\Ve recognize, however, that because the" animation represents
only a re-creation of the proponent's version of the event," it" should
(continued ... )
4
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~51 Because the animations offered to illustrate Mr. Gaskill's
testimony were only visual representations of his opinions, the
evidence was demonstrative in nature. It is uncontested that
Mr. Gaskill did not know the exact computer processes through
which the animations were created. But the court had already found
that Mr. Gaskill's testimony about the events depicted in the
animations was relevant under rule 401 and it did not exclude the
testimony or animations based on prejudice under rule 403.

,s2

The State argues that the animations do not accurately
represent the facts because, under the State's theory, there was only
one shooter. But this argument misapprehends the burden for
admissibility of demonstrative evidence under rule 901. Rule 901
does not require that the demonsh·ative evidence be uncontroversial,
but only that it accurately represents what its proponent claims.
Mr. Gaskill confirmed that the animations accurately represented his
expert interpretation of the facts. Therefore, the district court erred
when it did not admit the animations.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN BARRING THE
TESTIMONY OF DR. OFSHE
ciJ53 Mr. Perea argues that the district court also erroneously
excluded the testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe, a defense expert who
intended to testify regarding false confessions. The district court
ruled first that Dr. Ofshe could not testify as to the truthfulness of
Mr. Perea's confession. lt next questioned whether or not an expert
was needed to testify to the phenomena of false confessions and
concluded that "a jury of lay people can decide the question as to
whether or not a confession is reliable, involuntary, or coerced
without having an expert testify on that issue." 5 Finally, the court
I~

4(. ..continued)
in no way be viewed as the absolute truth." Clark v. Cantrell, 529
S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C. 2000). And we echo the Supreme Court of
South Carolina in "encourag[ing] the [district] court to give a
cautionary instruction" to the jury that it is not the absolute truth
"and, like all evidence, it may be accepted or rejected in whole or in
part." Id.
We pause to note the distinction between false and coerced
confessions. Whether a confession is coerced is a question of law
that hinges on the manner in which the confession \.Vas obtained. In
contrast, whether a confession is false is a question of fact that hinges
(continued ... )
5
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found that Dr. Ofshe' s methods were not "science" and refused to
allow any of his proffered testimony.
Because we find that any error was harmless, we decline
to consider whether the district court erred when it prohibited
Dr. Ofshe from directly testifying as to the veracity of Mr. Perea's
confession. However, we find the district court did err when it
barred Dr. Ofshe from testifying as to the phenomenon of false
confessions generally.
,I54

A. Because Any Error Was Harmless, We Decline to Con.sider Whether

the District Court Erred in Prohil1iting Dr. Ofshe from Testifying as to
the Veracity of Mr. Perea's Confession
~ 55 Mr. Perea first argues that the district court erred when it
ruled that Dr. Ofshe could not opine on the truthfulness of
Mr. Perea' s confession. The State disagrees. In arguing as to the
propriety of Dr. Ofshe' s proffered testimony on this point, both
parties frame their arguments around rule 608 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, which prohibits testimony as to a witness's truthfulness
on a particular occasion. See State v. Rimnzasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391
(Utah 1989). However, by its plain language, rule 608 applies only
to a witness's character for truthfulness. UTAH R. EVID. 608(a) (" A
witness's credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about
the witness's reputation for having a character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness .... " (emphasis added)). Because Mr. Perea never
testified, he was not a wih1ess in this case. Rule 608 is therefore not
controlling.

Al though rule 608 is not controlling here, it may be that the
policy behind rule 608 is equally applicable to situations like this
where a wih1ess offers to testify as to the truthfulness of a nontestifying defendant's out-of-court statement. Indeed, in Rimnzasch,
we relied on rule 608 to disallow expert testimony as to the veracity
of a testifying witness's specific out-of-court statement, recognizing
the important public policy goal of preventing "trials from being
turned into contests between what would amount to modern
oath-helpers who would largely usurp the fact-finding function of
judge or jury." 775 P.2d at 392. This same public policy goal appears
to be implicated in the case of a defendant's out-of-court confession
CU 56

··.JJ

5(. .. continued)
on the veracity of the confession. It is both possible to have a
coerced, but true, confession, or a false confession that was not
coerced.
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when the defendant declines to testify. Thus, it may well be that rule
608' s prohibitions should be extended to apply to the out-of-court
statements of nontestifying witnesses. However, because the parties
to this appeal did not brief this issue, and because we conclude that
any error in refusing to admit Dr. Ofshe' s testimony is ultimately
harmless, see infra Section V .A.2, we decline to resolve the issue here.
,I57 Thus, we do not reach the question of whether the district
court erred when it prohibited Dr. Ofshe from testifying about the
veracity of Mr. Perea's confession.

B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion when It Refused to Allow
Dr. Ofshe to Testify About False Confessions Generally
158 Mr. Perea argues that juries do not understand the
phenomenon of false confessions and frequently disregard the
possibility of a false confession. He also argues that juries do not
understand the prevalence of false confessions, the aggressive and
persuasive techniques employed by police to elicit confessions from
suspects, or other factors that contribute to false confessions. He
accordingly argues that expert testimony was necessary to assist the
jury in evaluating the truthfulness of his confession. The State
responds that the district court was well within its discretion to
exclude the proposed expert testimony under rules 608(a) and 702(a)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence because such testimony constituted a
comment on Mr. Perea's credibility, and because the scientific
methodology on which Dr. Ofshe relied is unreliable.
159 Issues relating to the admissibility of expert testimony
regarding the reliability of confessions are similar to those relating
to the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reliability of
eyewitness identification testimony that we recently examined in
State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103. We therefore begin by
reviewing our analysis in that case.
1. Our Holding in Clopten Ivfade Clear that Cautionary Instructions
and Cross-Examination Are No Substitute For Expert Testimony
, 60 In February 2006, Deon Clopten was convicted of firstdegree murder for the shooting of Tony Fuailemaa outside of a
nightclub in Salt Lake City. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ,r 2. While
Mr. Clopten claimed that a man named Freddie VVhite was responsible for the shooting, several eyewitnesses testified that Mr. Clopten
was the shooter. Id. Without strong physical or forensic evidence,
the State relied in large part on the eyewitness testimony to convict
Mr. Clopten. Id.
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,I61 At trial, 1Vlr. Clopten sought to introduce an expert in
eyewitness identification, Dr. David Dodd, to testify regarding
various factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Id.
,r 3. These factors included" cross-racial identification, the impact of
violence and stress during an event, the tendency to focus on a
weapon" and the "suggestive nature of certain identification
procedures used by police." Id. The district court refused to admit
the expert testimony, reasoning that it was unnecessary because
"potential problems with eyewitness identification could be
explained using a jury instruction." Id. ,r 4. The court of appeals
deferred to the district court's judgment and upheld Mr. Clopten' s
conviction. Id. ,i 5. We granted certiorari to review the question of
"whether expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness
identification should be presumed admissible when timely requested." Id. ,r 6.
,I62 Our analysis in Clopten began with a review of State v.
Long, in which we concluded that "[a]Ithough research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems."
721 P.2d 483., 490 (Utah 1986). In Long, we therefore "abandon[ed]
our discretionary approach to cautionary jury instructions and
direct[ed] that ... [district] courts shall give such an instruction
whenever evewitness
identification is a central issue in a case and
.,
such an instruction is requested by the defense." Id. at 492.

,I 63 Although it was not our intention in Long to preclude the
admission of expert testimony regarding the infirmities of eyewitness identifications, that was what frequently occurred in practice.
Many district courts took the position that a cautionary jury
instruction entirely resolved the question of the reliability of
eyewitness identifications, and therefore precluded expert testimony
on that issue. Clopten, 2009 UT 8L1, ,r 13. We recognized in Clopten
that "[t]his trend ... is troubling in light of strong empirical research
suggesting that cautionary instructions are a poor substitute for
expert testimony." Id. ,I 14. We then noted that the more recent
empirical evidence had conclusively established that the accuracy of
eyewitness identification depends upon certain factors. Id. ,r 15.
Such factors included the race of the accused and the wih1ess, the
amount of time the accused was in view, lighting conditions,
distinctiveness of appearance, the use of a disguise, and the presence
of weapons or other distracting objects. Id. Unfortunately, "juries
are generally unaware of these deficiencies ... and thus give great
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weight to eyewitness identifications" even when they are potentially
unreliable. Id.
if64 Without expert testimony, a defendant is left with only
cross-examination and a cautionary jury instruction to convey the
potential shortcomings of an eyewitness identification. We concluded, however, that "[b]oth of these tools suffer from serious
shortcomings." Id. fl 16. \Ve noted that cautionary instructions were
only given when requested by the defense and were considered
ineffective at educating a jury because they are '' given at the end of
what might be a long and fatiguing trial ... buried in an overall
charge by the court" and instructions may come too late to alter the
jury's opinion of a witness whose testimony might have been heard
days before." Id. 1 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we
reasoned that cross-examination, while often able to expose lies or
half-truths, is far less effective when witnesses are mistaken but
believe that what they say is true. Even if cross-examination could
expose the mistake, [w]ithout the assistance of expert testimony, a
jury may have difficulty assessing the import of those factors in
gauging the reliability of the identification." Id. ,I 22.
II

11

165 On the other hand, we concluded that expert testimony
"substantially enhance[s] the ability of juries to recognize potential
problems with eyewitness testimony." Id. 1 25. And although the
actual number of wrongful convictions from mistaken eyewitness
identifications is unknown, ttte. possibility of such a wrongful
conviction provided sufficient justification for us to review the
implications of our decision in Long. Id. ,r 16 n.7.
, 66 Because we found that the empirical research regarding the
limitations of eyewitness identification had matured since our
decision in Long, we held in Clopten that expert testimony regarding
eyewitness identifications should be admitted as long as it met the
standards set out in rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. ,I 32.
Our expectation was that the "application of rule 702 will result in
the liberal and routine admission of eyewitness expert testimony."
Id. ,r 30. Although we cautioned that the admission of eyewitness
testimonv is not mandatorv, we warned that "the testimonv of an
eyewitness expert should not be considered cumulative or duplicative of cautionary instructions to the jury." Id. ,r,r 33-34.
.I

J

.,.,

,67 We then applied our holding to the facts in Clopten. \Ve
noted that the witnesses saw the shooter for no more than a few
seconds, from some distance away, at night, and while in extreme
fear for their own lives"; the shooter's face was disguised; the
II
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shooter was a different race than the witnesses; and the weapon
used in the murder may have distracted the witnesses. Id.~ 46. We
concluded that "the circumstances found in the Clop ten trial are
exactly those under which the testimony of an eyewitness expert is
most helpful to a jury." Id. ii 47. \/Ve overruled the court of appeals,
vacated the verdict, and remanded for a new trial because there was
a "reasonable likelihood that, if allowed to hear Dr. Dodd's testimony, the jury would have questioned the accuracy of the eyewitnesses more rigorously and would not have convicted Clopten." Id.

iJ 48.
2. Our Reasoning in Cloplen Is Directly Applicable to the Use of
Expert Testimony with Regard to the Phenomenon of False
Confessions
~68 This case presents issues closely paralleling those we
decided in Clopton. A confession, much like an eyewitness identification, is more or less reliable based on a number of factors.
Unfortunately, however, research has shown that the potential
infirmities of confessions are largely unknown to jurors."

i!69 False confessions are an unsettling and unfortunate reality
of our criminal justice system. Just as the criminal law is "rife with
instances of mistaken identification," Long, 721 P.2d at 491 (internal
quotation marks omitted), "[i]t is beyond dispute that some people
falsely confess to committing a crime that was never committed or
was committed by someone else". State v. 1\1auchley, 2003 UT 10,
,i 21, 67 P.3d 477. And like expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification, expert testimony about factors leading to a false
confession assists a "trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." UTAH R. Evm. 702(a).
C\j70 Recent laboratory-based studies have identified several
factors that increase the likelihood of false confessions. 7 Among the
factors identified are sleep deprivation, the presentation of false

'' Our analogy to Clopton is limited to a recognition that fact
finders can benefit from expert testimony relating to counterintuitive
phenomena that are dependent on numerous inter-related factors.
We make no judgment as to the relative merits of the studies rel a ting
to eyewitness identification versus those related to the prevalence of
false confessions.
These studies are discussed in greater detail below. See infra
Section II.B.3.
7
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evidence and use of minimization techniques by questioners, the
subject's age and intelligence level, and certain personality traits.
Though expert testimony regarding the phenomenon of false
confessions would not be appropriate in every case, when such
indicia are present, a defendant should be allowed to present expert
testimony on the subject.

,n

Importantly, the shortcomings in the use of cautionary
instructions and cross-examination in lieu of expert testimony are
even more acute when dealing with potentially false confessions
than when <leafing with potentially mistaken identifications. Crossexamination of eyewitnesses is routine in all cases. Conversely, the
ability to examine the defendant is only possible if he waives his
Fifth Amendment protections and testifies in his own case - a
situation that is far from routine. To require a defendant to testify
regarding the factors that contributed to his alleged false confession,
rather than allow the use of an expert witness, opens the defendant
up to cross-examination and impinges on his constitutionally
guaranteed right against self-incrimination. For these reasons,
expert testimony regarding the phenomenon of false confessions
should be admitted so long as it meets the standards set out in rule
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and it is relevant to the facts of the
specific case.
3. Dr. Ofshe's Testimony Satisfied
Admissibility Under Rule 702

the

Requirements for

,12 The two-part analysis articulated by rule 702 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert witness
testimony. "First, the trial judge must find that the expert testimony
,vill 'assist the trier of fact."' Clopten, 2009 UT 84, if 31 (quoting
UTAH R. EVID. 702(a)). Second, the party wishing to rely on the
expert's testimony must make a threshold showing that "the
principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony (1) are
reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been
reliably applied to the facts." UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). We therefore
analyze Dr. Ofshe's proffered testimony under these requirements.
a. Dr. Ofshe's proposed testimony would have enabled the _jury
to evaluate Mr. Perea' s claim that he falsely confessed
iJ73 Under rule 702(a), proposed expert testimony must" assist
the trier of fact." UTAH R. EVID. 702(a). Here, there is no question
that Dr. Ofshe's proposed testimony would have assisted the jury in
evaluating the reliability of Mr. Perea's confession. Testimony
regarding the factors that can lead to false confessions is exactly the
20
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type of evidence that would have helped the jury assess Mr. Perea's
claim that he falsely confessed. Such testimony aids a _jury in
reaching a just verdict because it puts a jury on guard to protect
against giving disproportionate weight to confessions where
multiple indicia of false confessions are present. In other instances,
however, such expert testimony may embolden juries to give more
weight to confessions where no such factors are present.
b. The science underlying Dr. Ofshe' s proffered testimony is
sufficiently developed to satisfy rule 702
174 Rule 702 next requires that proposed expert testimony be
supported by reliable scientific study and methodology. UTAH R.
EVID. 702(b). Rule 702 assigns to h·ial judges a 'gatekeeper'
responsibility to screen out unreliable expert testimony" and
cautions that "trial judges should confront proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism." UTAH R. Evro. 702 advisory
committee's note. But this '' threshold showing" requires "only a
basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony
to be admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct." Id.
11

175 Although a science in its infancy may not meet the
reliability standards of rule 702, as it matures, the science may
become sufficiently reliable to meet the "basic foundational showing
of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible." Id. And
that is what has happened to the science relating to false confessions.
In the 1990s, little research had been conducted on the phenomenon
of false confessions and many of the theories relating to it were not
sufficiently supported. But more contemporary, laboratory-based
studies have since been performed and demonstrate that the science
surrounding false confessions now meets the reliability standards of
rule 702.

,76 The State argues that Dr. Ofshe has no reliable scientific
evidence to support his conclusions about the factors that influence
the rate of false confessions.8 It argues that Dr. Ofshe's "work is
The State additionally argues that "[s]ince Dr. Ofshe and his
allies have not been able to determine the rate at which false
confessions occur, afortiori, they have not been able to determine the
rate at which any particular feature they identify as a component of
a false confession is associated with a false confession.'' The State's
logic is mathematically flawed, hovvever, because it is entirely
possible to know that a factor increases, decreases, or has no effect
(continued ... )
8
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predicated upon individual case studies of alleged false
confession[s]" rather than empirical evidence or laboratory research.
The State therefore contends that the defense cannot show that
Dr. Ofshe's "principles or methods" were "based upon sufficient
facts or data."
177 In support of its argument, the State principally relies cm
Professor Paul Cassell's article, The Guilty and the "Innocent": An
Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False
Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523 (1999). The district court
agreed with the State, concluding Dr. Ofshe' s proposed testimony
did not satisfy rule 702(b) because the false confession cases relied
upon by Dr. Ofshe "are not uniformly accepted within the scientific
community as being valid false confession cases," and "[t]here is no
empirical data or credible research that supports Dr. Ofshe's
opinions regarding false confessions." The district court also
explicitly stated that Professor Cassell was "more reliable" than
Dr. Ofshe. 9
,r78 Professor Cassell' s article criticizes the lack of empirical
evidence in Dr. Ofshe' s two original articles. But it does not speak
to the wealth of studies generated in the intervening years that the

continued)
on the underlying rate of false confessions without knowing the
underlying rate itself. A common sense example is that it is possible
to know that a car speeds up when the driver steps on the accelerator even if the exact starting or ending speeds are unknown.
Therefore it is mathematica1ly incorrect to say that nothing can be
known about the way factors influence the likelihood of a false
confession without knowing the underlying rate of false confessions.
8 ( ...

The district court went beyond the mandate of its gatekeeping
role when it engaged in such weighing of competing expert
testimony. A district court does not abuse its discretion when it
concludes that expert testimony does not have sufficient foundational support under rule 702- and this conclusion may be based, in
part, on a lack of consensus in the field. But a court exceeds its role
when it bars expert testimony because it prefers one theory or
researcher over another. An expert either meets or fails the standards under the rules of evidence. So-called "dueling experts" are
a standard feature of trials in which expert testimony is presented.
Rule 702 does not prohibit the admission of two reliable experts who
draw opposite conclusions based on the underlying evidence.
9
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defense presented to the district court. Dr. Ofshe' s report states that
his testimony not only relies on his original two articles, but also on
several more recent articles which, in turn, cite to numerous studies
performed by many other researchers. 10 These studies are based on
empirical data and laboratory research indicating that such factors
as sleep deprivation, presentation of false evidence, minimization
techniques, age, intelligence level, and personality traits all affect the
rate of false confessions. 11 This development of the science of false
confessions is substantially similar to the development of the science
of eyewitness identifications we considered in Clopte11.

179 \!Vhile a comprehensive review of the relevant studies is
beyond the scope of this opinion, a few of the most important
studies will be set forth here. For example, controlled laboratory
experiments have proven that sleep deprivation, which may be
present in prolonged interrogations, can increase susceptibility to
influence and has been shown to increase the rate of false confessions. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors
and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 16 (2010). "[S]leep
deprivation markedly impairs the ability to sustain attention,
flexibility of thinking, and suggestibility in response to leading
questions." Id.; see also, !vlark Blagrove, Effects of Length of Sleep
Deprivation 011 Interrogative Suggestibility, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.:APPLJED48 (1996); Yvonne Harrison &James A. Horn, The
Impact of Sleep Deprivation 011 Decision Making: A Review, 6 J. EXPERIMENTALPSYCHOL.: APPLIED 236 (2000).
180 Presentation of false evidence is another factor that has
been shown to increase the rate of false confessions. Numerous

rn Specifically, his report states: "There are several more recent
literature reviews which report research on which I also rely. These
reviews include The Psychology of Interrogation and Confessions Gudjonsson, John Wiley, New York 2003; The Psychology of Confessions - Kassin and Gudjonsson in Psychological Science in the Public
Interest, 5, 2004, The Road to Perdition: Extrcl//e Influence Tactics in the
Interrogation Room, D. Davis and W O'Donahue in O'Donahue and
Hollin (eds.), Ha11dl1ook of Forensic Psychology, New York, Basic
Books, 2004."

For a list of the independent studies corroborating the existence
of these factors see Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions:
Risk Factors and Reco111111c11datio11s., 34 LAvV & Hu:vt BEHAV. 3, 14-22
11

(2010).
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studies have demonstrated that the presentation of false evidence
renders individuals more vulnerable to manipulation. Kassin et al.,
Police-Induced Confessions, supra, at 14. These studies reveal that the
presentation of false information through confederates, witnesses,
counterfeit test results, and false physiological feedback can alter the
test subjects' visual judgments, 12 beliefs,13 perceptions of other
people.,1'• behaviors towards other people,1 5 emotional states, 16 selfassessments,17 and memories for observed and experienced events. 18
Additionally, laboratory experiments have confirmed that the
presentation of false evidence can increase the probability that an
innocent person confesses.

is1 In one study, college students were falsely accused of
pressing a key on a computer, causing it to crash, after they were
instructed to avoid the key. See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L.
Kiechet Tlze Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance,

E.g., Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A
Minority of One Against a Unanimous J\1a_jority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN & APPLIED 1 (1956); MUZAFERSHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OFSOCJALNORMS (1936).
12

Craig A. Anderson et al., Per~evercmce of Social Theories: The Role of
Explanal'ion in the Persistence of Discredited Infonnation, 39
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1037 (1980).

13

Henri Tajfel et al., Social Caf-egorization and Intergroup Belzaviour,
1 EURO. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149 (1971).
14

ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE
CLASSROOM: TEACHER EXPECTATION AND PUPILS' INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENT (1968).
15

Stanley Schachter & Jerome E. Singer, Cognitive, Social, and
Physiological Determinants of Emotional State, 69 PSYCHOL. REV. 379

16

(1962).

Jennifer Crocker et al., Social Stigma: The Affective Consequences of
Attributional Ambiguity, 60 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 218
17

(1991).

Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A
30-year Investigation of the MalleabilihJ of Memory, 12 LEARNING
& MEMORY 361(2005).

18
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Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125 (1996).
Despite their innocence and initial denials, sub:jects
were asked to sign a confession. In some sessions but
not others, a confederate said she witnessed the
subject hit the forbidden key. This false evidence
nearly doubled the number of students who signed a
written confession, from 48 % to 94 %.
Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra, at 17. Similar studies
have replicated this experiment and found similar results even when
the subject's confession led to detrimental financial or other
consequences. See,. e.g., Robert Horselenberg et al., Individual
Dtfferences and False Confessions: A Conceptual Replication ofKassin and
Kiechel, 9 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 1 (2003); Allison D. Redlich & Gail S.
Goodman, Taking Re~ponsibility for an Act Not Committed: The
Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 141 (2003).
The false confession rate in similar experiments was particularly
acute among children and juveniles. See, e.g., Ingrid Candel et al., "I
Hit the Shift-Key and Then the Computer Crashed": Children and False
Admissions, 38 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1381 (2005).
,s2 Minimization techniques used by police officers have also
been shown to increase the rate of false confessions. Using the
results from the experiment described above, it was found that
remarks that minimized the subjects' culpability significantly
increased the false confession rate. Jessica R. Klaver et al., E/fects of
Personality, Interrogation Techniques and Plausibility in an Experimental
False Confession Paradigm, 13 LEGAL&CRIMINOLOGICALPSYCHOL. 71
(2008). In another study, the test subjects were paired with a
confederate and given problem solving tasks. Melissa B. Russano et
al., Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental
Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481 (2005). They were instructed to work
together on some problems and alone on others. Id. By design,
some of the confederates sought help on a problem that was
supposed to be solved alone while others did not. Id. at 483. The
experimenter would then claim to find similarities in their answers
and accuse the subject of cheating. Id. When the accusation was
accompanied by minimization techniques, the rate of false confessions tripled. Id.
,183 Paradoxically, anecdotal evidence suggests that a defendant's actual innocence may actually increase an individual's
susceptibility to manipulation. Kassin et al., Police-lnduced Con_fessions, supra, at 22-23. The innocent are often more likely to waive
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their rights, believing that since they did nothing wrong, they have
nothing to hide. Id. at 23. This c~mports with the commonplace, but
naive, notion that only the guilty are accused of crimes and only the
guilty need attorneys. Id.
We detail these studies not to endorse a particular position
on the false confessions literature, but rather to emphasize the
proper role of courts as gatekeepers under the rules of evidence. The
aforementioned factors and studies are but a portion of the scientifically reliable information on risk factors of false confessions. And
the defense presented this information to the district court, either
directly through Dr. Ofshe' s proposed testimony or through the
various articles on which Dr. Ofshe based his intended testimony.
Rule 702(b)(2) requires that the district court consider all the relevant
indicia of reliability in determining whether a threshold showing has
been made. UTAH R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note. Therefore,
even if Dr. Ofshe' s original two articles lacked the requisite foundation of "sufficient facts or data," the district court could only
properly exclude Dr. Ofshe's testimony if it concluded that all the
other studies on which the testimony is based also lacked sufficient
facts or data." UTAH. R. EVID. 702(b)(2). At a minimum, the science
behind these studies of false confessions is sufficiently developed to
meet the threshold of admissibility.
if84

11

,-J85 The district court abused its discretion when it evaluated
only the reliability of Dr. Ofshe's hvo articles and failed to consider
the dozens of other studies on which his testimony relied. Just as the
science regarding eyewitness identifications has sufficiently matured
to allow its routine introduction after Clopten, so too has the science
regarding false confessions.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT REFUSED
TO ALLOW POTENTIAL DEFENSE vVITNESSES TO TESTIFY
,I86 Prior to trial, the district court ruled that if the defense was
unwilling to provide the State with the names of potentially
exculpatory witnesses, the court would not allow those witnesses to
testify. I\llr. Perea argues that the district court's decision" deprived
[him] of an opportunity to present crucial evidence in his defense."
The State counters that because" the prosecution, the [district] court,
and the public have a vita] interest in the integrity of the trial
process," the court's decision to make the testimony conditional on
the disclosure of the witnesses' names was within the discretion
granted to the district court.
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il87 iv1r. Perea argues that the Compulsory Process Clause of
the Sixth Amendment grants defendants the right to call favorable
witnesses, particularly when those witnesses are "material and
favorable to his defense." United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858,867 (1982). VVhile a defendant's right to call favorable witnesses
is a "fundamental element of due process of law," Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967), [t]he right to present defense
witnesses ... is not absolute," United States v. Russell, 109 F.3d 1503,
1509 (10th Cir. 1997). For instance, in Taylor v. Illinois, the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed a district court's exclusion of a potentially
exculpatory defense witness based on the defense's discovery
violation. 484 U.S. 400,418 (1988). The Court began by stating that
"[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony
that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under
standard rules of evidence.'' Id. at 410. The Court continued,
stating:
11

The defendant's right to compulsory process is itself
designed to ... [ensure that] judgments [are not]
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the
facts. Rules that provide for pretrial discovery of an
opponent's witnesses serve the same high purpose ...
[and] minimize[] the risk that a judgment will be
predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony.
Id. at411-12 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's ruling
makes clear that a district court's decision to ;'[e]xclud[e] witnesses
for failure to comply with discovery orders, if not an abuse of
discretion, does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process." Russell, 109 F.3d at 1509.

,ss

Under rule 16(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
" [e ]xcept as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall
disclose to the prosecutor such information ... [or] item of evidence
which the court determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately
prepare his case." Because district courts must manage discovery in
such a way as to prevent unfair prejudice to either party, they do not
abuse their discretion when they exclude witnesses based on a
party's failure or refusal to disclose a witness's identity. For
instance, in State v. lv1aestas our court of appeals held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded an alibi witness
because the defense had failed to timely notify the prosecution of the
witness. 815 P.2d 1319, 1325 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court
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reasoned that disclosure" prevents last minute surprises and enables
the prosecution to make a full and thorough investigation of the
merits of the defense.'' Id.
Here, the district court acknowledged concerns regarding
potential retaliation against the defense witnesses, and it left open
the possibility that it would allow the witnesses to testify under an
assumed name or undertake similar protective measures. But,
emphasizing its duty "to [ensure] a fair trial," and concluding that
the potential witnesses were both relevant and material to
Mr. Perea' s defense, the district court determined that fairness
afforded the State an opportunity to fully investigate the witnesses'
stories. Such a decision is not an abuse of discretion when it
"prevents last minute surprises and enables the prosecution to make
a full and thorough investigation of the merits of the defense.'' Id.
We therefore hold that the district court did not err when it excluded
the potential defense witnesses.
i189

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED
MR. PEREA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS CONFESSION

'if 90 Mr. Perea next argues that his confession should have been
suppressed for a Miranda violation. Specifically, Mr. Perea argues
that his statement" that he needed to speak with a lawyer first before
he came in" was sufficient to anticipatorily invoke his right to
counsel. The State argues first that a defendant cannot anticipatorily
invoke his right to counsel prior to a custodial interrogation. It next
argues that even if an anticipatory invocation of the right is proper,
Mr. Perea' s statements do not constitute a proper invocation of that
right. We agree with the State and therefore hold that the district
court did not err when it denied Mr. Perea' s motion to suppress his
confession.
,I91 The U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision inMirandav.
Arizona prevents the use of incriminating statements "stemming
from custodial interrogation of [a] defendant" unless certain
procedural safeguards are met. 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966). Therefore,
[p ]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he
has ... a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed ... [and if] he indicates in any manner and at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking there can be no questioning." Id. at 444-45. In Edwards v.
Arizona, the Court expanded the scope of Miranda and held that once
a custodial suspect has "expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel," he cannot be" subject to further interrogation
11
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by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." 451 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1981).
4f[92 Although the Court has not ruled directly on the issue
before us, a footnote in McNeil 'V. Wisconsin suggests that the Court

would not allow a defendant to anticipatorily invoke his right to
counsel. 501 U.S. 171 (1991). The Court stated that while it has
never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights
anticipatorily, in a context other than" custodial interrogation" . . . [t]he fact that we have allowed the
Niiranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective
with respect to future custodial interrogation does not
necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted
initially outside the context of custodial interrogation,
with similar future effect.

Id. at 182 n.3 (citations omitted). Moreover, the Court has repeatedly
clarified that a suspect' s A1iranda rights are contingent on his being
subject to a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496
U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (stating that lv1iranda is premised on "the
interaction of custody and official interrogation"); Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291,299 (1980) (""The concern of the Court in Miranda
was that the interrogation environment created by the interplay of
interrogation and custody would subjugate the individual to the w:ill
of his examiner and thereby undermine the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination." (internal quotation marks omitted));
Oregon v. lviathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977) ("Our decision in
A1iranda set forth rules of police procedure applicable to custodial
interrogation." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
193 Similarly, this court has stated that the procedural
safeguards of lv1iranda apply only when a defendant is in custody.
In State v. Shuman, we stated that "lviiranda warnings are required
only where a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in a significant way." 639 P.2d 155, 157
(Utah 1981). And in State v. Cruz, we stated that "the Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches during custodial interrogation, or
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or othenvise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." 2005 UT 45, ~ 43, 122 P.3d 543
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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,-J94 Here, Mr. Perea's statement "that he needed to speak with
a lawyer first before he came in" occurred two days before Mr. Perea
was arrested. When he was arrested, police read Ivlr. Perea his
l\-1iranda rights, which he then waived. Prior to his interrogation, he
was again advised of his Miranda rights, and he once again waived
those rights. Mr. Perea was once again advised of his NI.iranda rights
when he signed the confession and he acknowledged in writing that
he was aware of the waiver of his rights.

Assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Perea's statement
two days before his arrest constitutes a request for a lawyer's
assistance, such a prospective request would still be subject to
waiver. Had Mr. Perea made the same statement at any point
during his custodial interrogation, our decision may be different.
But that was not the case. And once he was taken into custody, Mr.
Perea waived his rights to the assistance of counsel when he
consented to the investigators' questioning and confessed to the
shootings.
·
,I95

if 96 Because ~fr. Perea was advised of and subsequently
waived his lv1iranda rights, the district court did not err when it
denied Mr. Perea's motion to suppress his confession.
V. BASED ON THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF MR.

PEREA'S GUILT, WE HOLD THAT THE DISTRICT COURT'S
ERRORS WERE HARMLESS AND THAT THE CUMULATIVE
ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY
197 Even if the district court did err, we will not reverse if that
error was harmless. See State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ,I 48, 20 P.3d 271.
"In order to show that the error is harmful, [Mr. Perea] must
demonstrate that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for [him], or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. A1edina-Juarcz,
2001 UT 79, 1 18, 34 P.3d 187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, the doctrine of cumulative error is applicable" only if the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines ... confidence
that a fair trial was had." State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, ,r 39,220 P.3d
136. It is a doctrine used when a single error may not constitute
grounds for reversal, but mant errors, when taken collectively,
nonetheless undermine confidence in the fairness of a trial.
A. Individually, the District Court's Errors Are Harmless

,98
\Ne have concluded that the district court erred when it
limited the testimony of Mr. Gaskill and chose not to admit the
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proposed testimony of Dr. Ofshe. But the potential harm of each
error must be viewed against the backdrop of the entire body of
evidence. And when so viewed, the errors were harmless.
,99
There was significant testimony from witnesses both
inside and outside of the SUV stating that Mr. Perea was the
individual who fired shots into the crowd at Mr. Nava' s house.
Angelo Gallegos and Elias Garcia, both passengers in the SUV and
friends of Mr. Perea, testified that Mr. Perea fired shots from the
SUV as it pulled away from the party. Similarly, Ms. Valencia, who
was standing near the street and knew Mr. Perea, testified that as the
SUV pulled away, "I seen [him] over the top, shooting." Two other
party guests, Richard Esquivel and Lacey Randall, testified that they
saw someone from the passenger side of the SUV lean over the roof
and fire towards 1v1r. Nava' s house. And Keri Garcia, who was
standing in Mr. Nava' s driveway when the shots from the SUV were
fired, testified that the shots came only from the direction of the
road.
~100 Additionally, during questioning, Mr. Perea volunteered
that the gun he had used was .22 caliber, a fact that the police had
not shared with the public. Although the murder weapon was not
recovered, police investigators recovered ten expended .22 caliber
shell casings in the street in front of Mr. Nava' s house, all fired from
the same weapon. Likewise, the bullets from 1v1s. Prieto' s and
Mr. Navarez' s bodies were .22 caliber. No other shell casings were
found at the crime scene.
1. The District Court's Exclusion of Mr. Gaskill's Animations Was
Harmless
,I101 ½bile the district court excluded rvfr. Gaskill' s computergenerated animations, it did not exclude his expert testimony on
which the animations were based. It allowed him to opine as to his
theory that there were multiple shooters and that the location of
some of the injuries made it unlikely that 1v1r. Perea could have made
the shots. He was allowed to refer to diagrams depicting the scene
and demonstrate the bullet trajectories that gave him concern. And
although Mr. GaskiW s theories conflicted with the State's theory and
the testimony of many of the State's witnesses, the district court
appropriately allowed him to present his theory to the jury.
,I102 After having reviewed both the testimony provided by
Mr. Gaskill and his proffered animations, we hold that the exclusion
of the animations does not create the "reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant." 1v1edin.a-Juarez, 2001 UT
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79, ,r 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). The animations were
short, provided nothing that Mr. Gaskill did not make clear in his
testimony, and used a perspective that was unhelpful in putting
Mr. Gaskill' s testimony in context. Because J\-1r. Gaskill was allowed
to fully testify as to his multiple-shooter theory and cast doubt on
the State's single-shooter theory, the exclusion of the animations
does not undermine our confidence in the verdict.
2. The District Court's Exclusion of Dr. Ofshe's Testimonv_, Was
Harmless
1103 We next evaluate any prejudice arising from the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Ofshe' s testimony. We begin by noting that the
district court did not err in admitting Mr. Perea's confession. Even
had the district court allowed Dr. Ofshe to testify, the jury would
have been entitled to consider Mr. Perea' s confession. Nor did it err
in ruling that Dr. Ofshe could not testify as to the veracity of
Mr. Perea's confession. Rather, its only error consisted in barring
Dr. Ofshe' s proffered testimony about the factors that may contribute to false confessions. \Ve find this error to be harmless because of
the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Perea's guilt.
i1104 Multiple individuals who knew Mr. Perea testified that
he shot into the crowd. Indeed, the defense's theory was not based
on Mr. Perea' s exclusion from the crime but on a multiple-shooter
theory. Thus, the exclusion of testimony that would have merely
cast doubt on Mr. Perea's confession does not undermine our
confidence in the verdict. Had this been a case like Clopten, in which
the evidence of guilt was circumstantial and there were significant
issues with eyewitness identification, the exclusion of Dr. Ofshe' s
testimony would be more concerning. In that case, the admission of
an unrebutted confession would have the potential to overwhelm
anv other evidence of innocence. But here, where there was
substantial, independent evidence of Mr. Perea' s guilt and his
primary defense did not necessarily absolve him of the crime, the
admission of Dr. Ofshe' s proposed testimony was unlikely to change
the outcome of the trial.
.I

B. The District Court's Errors Do not Constitute Cumulative Error

i-f 105

Having concluded that the district court's errors were
harmless individually, we now evaluate their cumulative effect on
our confidence in the verdict. Cumulative error is applicable in
those instances where the district court's collective errors rise to a
level that undermine our confidence in the fairness of the proceed-
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ings. But that analysis cannot be conducted in a vacuum, ignorant
of the other evidence demonstrating guilt.
,I106 The body of evidence established that Mr. Perea was at
the crime scene that evening. It left no doubt that he was in the
vehicle from which a number of witnesses testified the shots came.
Those witnesses, two of whom were present in the vehicle, testified
that it was Mr. Perea who fired shots into the crowd at Mr. Nava' s
house. The two witnesses who were in the SUV, and at least one of
whom witnessed the shooting from Mr. Nava's front yard, were
personally familiar with Mr. Perea - he was not a nameless, faceless
defendant to them. And, Mr. Perea' s knowledge of the type of
weapon used in the shooting and the physical evidence at the crime
scene provides further evidence that the jury could consider in
evaluating his guilt. Finally, Mr. Perea' s confession was evidence
that the jury was entitled to consider.
,I107 vVhen viewed against the eyewitness testimony, the
physical evidence, and Mr. Perea's confession, we cannot say that
the district court's individual errors rise to the level of cumulative
error. Where there is overwhelming evidence that Mr. Perea shot
into the crowd, the exclusion of the expert testimony at issue does
not undermine our confidence in the overall fairness of the proceedings or the jury's verdict.
VI. MR. PEREA'S SENTENCE OF LWOP IS CONSTITUTIONAL
1108 Utah Code section 76-3-207.7 provides that " [a] person
who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony
aggravated murder ... shall be sentenced by the court ... [to] life in
prison without parole or an indeterminate prison term of not less
than 25 years and which may be for life.''
iJ109 Mr. Perea argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the Utah
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution in a number of ways. First,
he argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it
authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. He next
argues that the statute violates the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Utah Constitution and the federal Constitution and
that it runs afoul of the uniform operation of laws provisions of the
Utah Constitution. Finally, he argues that his sentence violates the
unnecessary rigor provision of the Utah Constitution and the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the federal Constitution. We
find these arguments unavailing and conclude that section 76-3-207.7
is constitutional on its face and as applied to Mr. Perea.
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A. Utah Code Section 76-3-207.7 Is not Unconstitutionally Vague

Because Utah Code section 76-3-207.7 does not list the
factors a sentencing court must consider when deciding whether to
impose a sentence of 25 years to life or LWOP, Mr. Perea argues that
it is unconstitutional1y vague. Unconstitutionally vague laws violate
the due process prohibition that no one "may be required at peril of
life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes." United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.114, 123 (1979) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a statute may be unconstitutionally vague if ,vritten in a way that "authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'' Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703, 732 (2000).
1110

In arguing that section 76-3-207.7 is unconstitutionally
vague, Mr. Perea cites primarily to cases where courts have overturned statutes that did not adequately explain the criminal act. See,
e.g., City lf Cl1icago v. i\1orale~, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (holding that a
city's loitering statute was unconstitutionally vague because it gave
officers unfettered discretion to criminalize otherwise lawful
behavior). Although it is well settled that statutes must clearly
articulate the behavior that they proscribe, there are far fewer cases
in which vague sentencing guidelines have been overturned. Even
so, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that "vague sentencing
provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state
with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal
statute." Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123.
,111

\Ve conclude that section 76-3-207.7 does not suffer from
such an infirmitv.
., It states c1earlv
., that a defendant convicted of noncapital first-degree felony aggravated murder may be incarcerated
for a term up to and induding the rest of his life. \'Vhile it also holds
out the possibility of a more lenient sentence of 25 years to life, the
fact that the sentencing court may choose to impose the more lenient
sentence does not render the statute unconstitutional. Sentencing
courts have long been afforded broad discretion in sentencing. And
when section 76-3-207.7 is read in the context of Utah's sentencing
scheme as a whole, we conclude that it provides sufficient guidance
to withstand Mr. Perea's facial vagueness challenge. We further
conclude that it was not unconstitutionally applied to Mr. Perea.
1112

District courts have historically been afforded broad
discretion when it comes to sentencing. The U.S. Supreme Court has
stated:
~1113

[Although t]ribunals passing on the guilt of a defen34
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dant always have been hedged in by strict evidentiary
procedural limitations ... both before and since the
American colonies became a nation, courts in this
country and in England practiced a policy under
which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide
discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to
assist him in determining the kind and extent of
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,246 (1949). 19
,i114 So long as a statute clearly specifies the maximum
allowable penalty, it is not unconstitutional for sentencing judges to
exercise their discretion in offering leniency. See State v. Shelby, 728
P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986) (stating that this court will overturn a
sentence that is within the statutorily prescribed range only for an
abuse of discretion). For example, sentencing judges may choose to
suspend all or part of a sentence. See UTAH CODE§ 77-18-1(2)(a);
Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1944) (noting that "[t]he
right to suspend imposition of sentence ... is a discretionary right").
Even under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, where the
actual time served by any particular defendant is determined by the
Board of Pardons, sentencing judges are given discretion to sentence
a defendant as if he had been convicted of the next lower degree of
offense. UTAH CODE§ 76-3-402(1). 20 And we can find no authority

See also State v. Shuler, 780 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that a sentencing court may consider a defendant's
"criminal character and history" despite the absence of prior
convictions}; State v. Huey, 505 A.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Conn. 1986)
(finding that a sentencing court may consider prior indictments,
uncharged allegations, dismissed counts, and acquittals); Smith v.
State, 517 A.2d. 1081, 1083 (:tvld. 1986) (holding that a sentencing
judge may consider "the facts and circumstances of the crime itself
and the background of the individual convicted of committing the
crime").
19

20

Utah Code section 76-3-402(1) provides that if
the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was
found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant ... concludes it would be unduly harsh to
record the conviction as being for that degree of
(continued ... )
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to support the notion that a sentencing judge's statutory authority
to grant leniency renders a sentencing statute unconstitutional.
1115 :tvlr. Perea argues that section 76-3-207.7 is impermissibly
vague because it does not specify the particular items the sentencing
court must consider in deciding which of the two possible sentences
to impose. \Ve are unpersuaded. Section 76-3-207.7 must be read in
the context of Utah's sentencing scheme as a whole. To give full
effect to the Legislature's intent, we construe statutes in harmony
"with other statutes under the same and related chapters." Lyon v.
Burton, 2000 UT 19, i1 17, 5 P.3d 616. And, ·when read in context, the
statutory scheme provides adequate guidance to sentencing courts.
Utah Code section 76-1-104 provides that "[t]he provisions of [the
criminal] code shall be construed ... [to p ]revent arbitrary or
oppressive treatment . . . [and to p ]rescribe penalties which are
proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit
recognition o[f] differences in rehabilitation possibilities among
individual offenders." Section 76-1-106 reinforces section 76-1-104
by providing that" [a ]II provisions of this code and offenses defined
by the laws of this state shall be construed ... to effect the objects of
the law and general purposes of [s]ection 76-1-104." When read in
harmony, these provisions make clear that a sentencing court is to
consider all the evidence before it-the totality of the circumstances-in imposing a sentence that is proportionate to the crime
and the culpability of the defendant.
116 The notion that a sentencing court should consider the
totality of the circumstances in determining a proportionate sentence
is also supported by our evidentiary rules. Rule 110l(c) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence provides that our evidentiary rules do not apply
during sentencing, opening the door to the court's evaluation of a
variety of factors. See also State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah
1986) (A sentencing court" must be permitted to consider any and all
information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence for the
particular defendant, given the crime committed." (quoting Wasman
v. United States, 468 U.S. 559,563 {1984)). Because our rules do not
constrain the introduction of any evidence tending to inform the
811

continued)
offense established by statute, the court may enter a
judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of
offense and impose sentence accordingly.

20 ( ...
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court's determination, it is not incumbent upon the statute to
enumerate the factors the sentencing judge may or must consider.
,I117
Indeed, it has only been in capital cases that we have
required an explicit weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.
See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,, 130, 20 P.3d 342 (reiterating
the district court's obligation to weigh the mitigating and aggra.v ating circumstances in a capital case); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019,
1027 (Utah 1989) (stating that the first step'' in a capital sentencing
evaluation is" to determine whether the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt'');
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982) (holding that the capital
sentencing standards" require that the sentencing body compare the
totality of the mitigating against the totality of the aggravating
factors"). Absent statutorily articulated aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in noncapital cases, courts have historically based
their sentencing decisions on the totality of the circumstances. See,
e.g., State 1.1. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ~ 59, 191 P.3d 17 (stating that
'' courts must consider all legally relevant factors in making a
sentencing decision"); State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah
1980) (" A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the
defend ant in light of his background and the crime committed and
also serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice
system.").
Ii

,r118
And that is exactly what the district court did here.
Specifically, the district court found that ]\,fr. Perea's relative youth,
his poor educational background, and his borderline IQ/learning
disability constituted mitigating factors. But the district court found
that there were a wealth of aggravating factors to offset these
considerations, including the multiple young victims, the fact that
1.1Ir. Perea fired ten shots into a large group of partygoers, and
Mr. Perea's lengthy prior criminal record.
11

'11119 Because district courts are in the best position to ensure
that justice is done and to determine whether any '[o]ne factor in
mitigation or aggravation [should] weigh more than several factors
on the opposite scale,"' they are" allowed a great deal of discretion
in determining the relative weight of competing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances." Slate v. lvforeno, 2005 UT App 200, 'lf 9,
113 P.3d 992 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Russell, 791 P.2d
188, 192 (Utah 1990)). And as here, where the district court considered the totality of the circumstances and explicitly weighed the
mitigating and aggravating factors, we are not persuaded that it
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abused its discretion or applied the statute in an unconstitutional
fashion.

B. A1r. Perea's Argument that Utah Code Section 76-3-207.7 Violates
the Due Process Protections of the Utah and U.S. Constitutions Is
Inadequately Briefed
i1120 Mr. Perea next argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the
due process protections contained within the Utah and U.S.
Constitutions. While he cites to relevant constitutional provisions,
he provides absolutely no analysis as to how those provisions render
his sentence unconstitutional. Because an issue is inadequately
briefed "when it merely contains bald citation[s] to authority
[without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis
based on that authority," Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health Ctr, Inc.,
2003 UT 23, ~ 46, 70 P.3d 904 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted), we decline to address Mr. Perea' s
assertion that section 76-3-207.7 violates his due process rights.
C. Utah Code Section 76-3-207.7 Does not Violate the Uniform

Operation of Laws Provision
,J121 Mr. Perea argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the
uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution.
Article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution requires that "[a]ll laws
of a general nature sha11 have uniform operation." Under the
uniform operation of laws provision, a statute must be "uniform on
its face." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995). Further, it "is
critical that the operation of the [statute] be uniform," such that
similarly situated people are treated similarly under the statute. Id.
(emphasis in original).
iJ122 Our analysis under the uniform operation of laws
provision requires that we first "determine what classifications, if
any, are created by the statute." Id. \Ve must then analyze "whether
different classes or subclasses are treated disparately. Finally, if any
disparate treatment exists between classes or subclasses, we must
determine whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that
warrants the disparity." Id. Mr. Perea asserts that section 76-3-207.7
divides the general class made up of those found guilty of aggravated murder into two subclasses based on the sentence imposed by
the district court. He then asserts that the disparate treatment
between those sentenced to 25 years to life and those sentenced to
LWOP is not justified because the statute fails to provide guidance
to the district court.
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,I123 We disagree. Not all those found guilty of aggravated
murder are similarly situated. \tVhile all are found guilty of the same
crime, each case and each defendant presents a different set of facts
and a different combination of aggravating and mitigating factors.
The discretion afforded to district courts furthers the legitimate
legislative purpose of sentencing offenders based on the totality of
the unique circumstances present in each case. District courts are
authorized and empowered by the Legislature to review the totality
of the circumstances before imposing a sentence. Therefore, because
the discretion given to district courts furthers the legitimate
legislative purpose of sentencing offenders based on the severity of
their particular circumstances, we hold that section 76-3-207.7 does
not violate our uniform operation of laws provision.

D. Nir. Perea's Sentence Does not Violate tlze Unnecessary Rigor
Provi~ion of the Utah Constitution
1124 1\llr. Perea argues that his sentence of LWOP violates the
Utah Constitution's unnecessary rigor provision because it fails to
take into account his "age, mental disabilities and IQ." But Mr.
Perea misapprehends the application of the unnecessary rigor
provision. That provision protects prisoners from "the imposition
of circumstances ... during their confinement that demand more of
the prisoner than society is entitled to require." Dexter v. Bosko, 2008
UT 29, ,I 17, 184 P.3d 592. It therefore applies only to the conditions
of one's confinement and does not speak to the proportionality of the
particular sentence imposed. The unnecessary rigor provision is
therefore not implicated by the imposition of his sentence of L'\NOP.

E. .Mr. Perea's Sentence Does not Constitute Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Under the U.S. Constitution
,I125 Finally, Mr. Perea argues that his sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits cruel
and unusual punishments. He argues that his relatively young age,
coupled with his low IQ, militates against a sentence of LWOP. In
support of his argument, Mr. Perea cites to the Supreme Court's
holdings in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (holding that
juveniles, those persons under eighteen years of age, cannot be
sentenced to death); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of LWOP for
juvenile non-homicide offenders); and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 318 (2002) (holding that persons with an IQ below 70 cannot be
executed because such individuals are too mentally impaired to
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"understand and process information, to communicate ... to engage
in logical reasoning, [and] to control impulses").
1126 But the holdings of these cases are inapplicable to the
present case. Roper does not controJ because Mr. Perea was neither
sentenced to death 21 nor a juvenile offender at the time of the
shootings. It is uncontested that Mr. Perea was nineteen years old
at the time of the shootings and he was sentenced only to LWOP.
Similarly, the Court's holding in Graham is inapplicable because
~fr. Perea was not found guilty of a non-homicide crime, but was
found guilty of aggravated murder arising from the death of two
individuals. Finally, it is uncontested that although Mr. Perea has
been diagnosed with a low IQ, his score of 77 puts him above the
line drawn by the Supreme Court in Atkins.

'i\127 In spite of the differences between Mr. Perea and the
defendants sentenced in Roper, Graham, and Atkins, the district court
was authorized to evaluate the totality of the circumstances and
could have chosen to impose a less severe sentence. It did not,
however, based on its weighing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances present in this case. And in the absence of a statutory
mandate or compelling factual circumstances indicating the district
court erred, we will not second-guess the district court, which is "in
the best position to ensure that justice is done." l\1oreno, 2005 UT
App 200, ,i 9. We therefore hold that Mr. Perea's sentence is not
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
of the federal Constitution.
VIL MR PEREA'S CLAIM THAT ALL STATION-HOUSE
CONFESSIONS SHOULD BE RECORDED DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL

~128 Finally, we turn to l\,fr. Perea' s argument that we should
require the police to record all confessions given at police stations.
Mr. Perea argues that recording station-house confessions aids the
fact finder in ascertaining the truth and that the absence of a
recording makes it difficult to assess the voluntariness of a confession. The State concedes that" an electronic recording requirement

See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983) ("It is true that the
penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment,
not in degree but in kind. As a result, our decisions [in] capital cases
are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the
punishment in a noncapital case." (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
21
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would have benefits," but argues the determination of this issue is
better left to a legislative body. While we have concerns about the
Ogden Police Department's policy of not recording interrogations or
confessions, this appeal is not the appropriate context for addressing
those concerns.
,-J129 Although Mr. Perea goes on at great length about the
necessity of recording a suspecf s confession, he concedes that such
recordings are not required by the Utah Constitution or our case
law. 22 Nor does lvfr. Perea explain how a ruling in his favor on this
issue would change the outcome of his appeal. Rather, lv1r. Perea
argues that this court" should require'' the recording of station-house
confessions - a prospective ruling that would not impact the
investigators' decision not to record the confession in this case.
~130 Because there was no constitutional, statutory, or
common law obligation for the investigators to record Mr. Perea' s
confession, and because any ruling that law enforcement should
record interrogations in the future would have no effect on the case
before us, we decline r-...fr. Perea' s invitation to judicially pronounce
a requirement that investigators record station-house confessions.
Nevertheless, the benefits of recording station-house confessions are
worth considering, 23 especially when viewed in light of current

See State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419,427 (Utah 1995) (concluding
that the recording of confessions is not required by the Utah
Constitution).
22

Such benefits include "avoiding unwarranted claims of
coercion," preventing the use of" actual coercive tactics by police,"
and demonstrating "the voluntariness of the confession, the context
in which a particular statement was made, and ... the actual content
of the statement." State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The recording of confessions provides clear evidence of coercion or a lack of coercion and
assists the fact finder in determining a confession's voluntariness.
Furthermore, such recordings protect police officers and departments from false claims of coercion and misconduct. In the past,
there were serious technical and cost barriers to recording confessions. But such concerns have been largely ameliorated by technology. The necessary equipment is not cost prohibitive and is
standard equipment on almost every cell phone. When police
officers refuse to record interrogations and confessions despite the
(continued ... )
23
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technological advances and the Attorney General's recommendations in favor of recording. 24 These potential benefits, along with
possible arguments against recording station-house confessions, are
most appropriately addressed in the first instance by our Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, ,vithin which the relative
merits of mandating a recording requirement can be fully debated.

CONCLUSION
~131 The district court did not err when it denied Mr. Perea' s
motion to suppress his confession because, even if his ambiguous
statement made two davs before he was taken into custodv
was
J
sufficient to constitute an invocation of his right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment, Mr. Perea thereafter voluntarily waived his right
to counsel. Similarly, the district court did not err when it barred the
testimony of potentially exculpatory witnesses whom the defense
would not identify.
J

1132 Although the district court did err when it limited and
excluded the testimony of the defense's expert witnesses, we
conclude these errors were harmless. Similarly, the combined result
of these errors does not undermine our confidence in the verdict.
VVe also find that section 76-3-207.7 is not unconstitutional and thus
affirm I\.1r. Perea' s sentence. Finally, the arguments for and against
a requirement to record station~house confessions are more appropriately addressed through the administrative process.

3(. .. continued)

2

presence of recording equipment, the State runs the risk that the fact
finder will draw the natural inference that the officers have attempted to hide some aspect of the interrogation, even when there
are no ill intentions.
In 2008, the Utah Attorney General's Office, in cooperation with
statewide law enforcement organizations, drafted a statement for
law enforcement that recommends electronic recording of custodial
interviews and gives guidelines for doing so. Contrary to those
recommendations, Ogden Police Department policy dictates that
officers are not to electronically record interrogations or confessions.
Despite the fact that the room in which Mr. Perea was questioned
was equipped to record (and an officer actually watched a live feed),
no effort was made to record his interrogation and subsequent
confession.
24
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~133 I concur fully in the reasoning and the result of the
majority opinion. I only write separately to express my views
regarding the Ogden Police Department's policy not to record
station-house interrogations or confessions-despite having the
means to do so. At the present time, I am persuaded that recording
confessions can only further the interests of justice by enhancing a
court's ability both to safeguard important Sixth Amendment
protections and to detect false claims of improper police coercion.
See supra~ 132 n.23. Due to these benefits, I believe that we should
adopt an evidentiary rule requiring station-house interrogations to
be recorded. I do not object to the referral of the question to our
rules advisory committee for study and recommendations, but note
that on the present state of the evidence and policy considerations
regarding this question, the arguments for a rule appear strong.
JUSTICE LEE, concurring:
~134 I agree with and concur in the court's op1mon and
disposition of this case, including its determination not to opine on
the "advisability" of issuing a rule regarding station-house interrogations. Supra ii 132. As the majority opinion explains, we are in no
position to weigh in on this maller, as there is no law currently
requiring recording of such interrogations and "a prospective
ruling ... would not impact the investigators' decision not to record
the confession in this case." Supra ii 131.

1135 In my view that should be the end of the matter. If we are
to leave it to our Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence to
address this question "in the first instance," suprn ,i 132, we should
not get ahead of the committee by weighing in through our opinions
in this case. Thus, I would not express the view "that recording
confessions can only further the interests of justice," or endorse the
position "that we should adopt an evidentiary rule requiring stationhouse interrogations to be recorded." Supra ,1 135 (Durham, J.,
concurring).
iJ136 First, we have no authority to adopt a rule, of evidence or
otherwise, "requiring station-house interrogations to be recorded."
Supra ,r 135. Our supervisory rulemaking authority extends only to
matters of evidence and procedure. See UTAH CONST. art. VIII,§ 4
("The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence
to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the
43
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appellate process."). It does not encompass the power to direct the
operations of law enforcement.
1137 Second, although we conceivably could adopt a rule
deeming unrecorded stationhouse confessions inadmissible under
the law of evidence, I do not think we have sufficient perspective on
the matter to opine on the wisdom of such a rule at this juncture.
Certainly there would be upsides to a rule foreclosing the admissibility of unrecorded confessions, as acknowledged above. See supra
,r 132. But I have no idea whether the benefits of such a rule are
"strong," supra CU 135, much less whether they might outweigh any
of the various costs or downsides of that approach (none of which
have been presented to us on this appeal, but surely will be considered by our advisory committee in due course).
i!138 Finally, the devil is undoubtedly in the details here. The
decision whether to adopt a rule of evidence should of course be
informed by the nature and content of any proposed rule. Such a
rule, moreover, would almost certainly have to be subject to
exceptions set forth in any proposed rule. And unless and until we
have the proposed text in front of us, I see no basis for an advisory
thumb on the scale in its favor. I would accordingly await the
results of our advisory committee process instead of weighing in in
advance.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT co
DISTRICT counr
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RIQOPEREA,
Petitioner,

RULING AND ORDER ON
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

vs.

Trial Court Case No. 140907173

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellate Court Case No. 20150144

Respondent.

Judge Ernie W. Jones

THE MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Petitioner's Motion for Relief from
Judgment filed on July 23, 2015. The State filed an opposition on September 21, 2015. Petitioner
did not file a reply, and the time for filing a reply is now past. See Utah R. Civ. Pro. Rule 7(c)(l).
Although neither party has filed a request to submit for decision, the Court of Appeals has
ordered this court to enter a ruling on Petitioner's motion within 60 days after remand.
Therefore, the court now enters its ruling DENYING Petitioner's motion as follows.
Petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief on November 12, 2014. The court
reviewed the petition pursuant to rule 65C(h)(l) and entered an order dismissing the petition on
January 12, 2015, because all of Petitioner's claims had already been fully adjudicated by the

Utah Supreme Court in State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68.
Petitioner now asks this court to set aside its order of summary dismissal pursuant to rule
60(b)(6). Petitioner alleges that on July 2, 2015-seven months after this court dismissed the
petition-Sarah Valencia infonned PetitionerJs counsel that she had been pressured to testify
falsely during Petitioner's criminal trial. Ms. Valencia signed an affidavit recanting her trial
testimony, and Petitioner attached a copy of her affidavit to his motion. According to Petitioner,

Ruling on Motion for Relief from Judgment

Case No. 140907173
Page 2 of4

because the Supreme Court heavily weighed Sarah Valencia's testimony in determining that any
errors at Petitioner's criminal trial were harmless, the court should grant Petitioner relief from
judgment based upon her affidavit.

In response, the State contends Petitioner's motion cannot be filed under rule 60(b)(6)
because he is claiming newly-discovered evidence under rule 60(b)(2). As such, Petitioner had
90 days after the court dismissed the petition to file his motion. Because Petitioner filed his
motion over seven months after the court entered its order, according to the State, the motion is
untimely.
To the extent Petitioner's motion is more properly labeled as a motion under rule
60(b)(2), the court finds that it is untimely and dismisses it on that basis. However, to the extent
Petitioner's motion is more properly submitted under rule 60(b)(6), the court concludes the
motion is timely. 1 A motion under rule 60(b)(6) must be filed within a "reasonable time."
Petitioner filed the motion only three weeks after learning of Ms. Valencia's allegations, which is
a reasonable time under the rule.
However, even if the motion is timely under rule 60(b)(6), the court concludes Petitioner
has not raised a meritorious defense to justify setting aside the dismissal of the petition. See

Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,r 108. Ms. Valencia's affidavit has no relation or relevance to
the claims asserted in the petition, and Petitioner offers no basis upon which the court should set
aside the dismissal of those claims. Rather, Petitioner presents an entirely new issue to the court
without regard to the claims he has previously adjudicated and that have previously been
dismissed. A motion for relief from judgment is, therefore, improper in this circumstance.

1 Because

Ms. Valencia's affidavit is not newly-discovered evidence that puts any of the claims in the petition in a
new light, the claim, arguably, does not fall into the rule 60(b)(2) subsection.
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Indeed, as suggested by the State, Petitioner's claim would more appropriately be brought in a
new petition for post-conviction relief.
Accordingly, Petitioner's motion is denied. This ruling and order is the order of the
court. No further order under rule 7(f)(2) is required.
Dated this_{__~ay of October, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the J12._ day of

GC-\:tio:t:X ,2015, I sent a true and correct

copy of the foregoing ruling to the following:
Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Randall W. Richards
Richards & Brown PC
Attorney for Petitioner
938 University Park Blvd Suite140
Clearfield, Utah 84015
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RANDALL W. RICHARDSW #4503 of
RICHARDS & BROWN P.C.
938 University Park Blvd., Suite 140
Clearfield, UT 84015
Telephone: (801) 773-2080
Facsimile: (801) 773-5078
laV1yers@richardsbrownlaw.com
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RIQO MARIANO PEREA
PETITIONER

)
)

·vs.

)
vJ

NOTICE OF APPEAL

STATE OF UTAH

Case No.140907173
Judge: JONES

)

RESPONDENT
)

COMES NOW the above named Petitioner, Rico Perea, by and through his
attorney, Randall W. Richards and hereby gives notice of intent to appeal the Order of
Summary Dismissal on the Petitioner's Petition for Relief under the Post Conviction
Remedies Act filed on November 11, 2014, that was entered hereon in the aboveentitled case on or about the 12th day of January 2015 to the Supreme Court of Utah.
DATED this n th day of February 2015.
_/s/: Randall W. Richards_
RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Petitioner

vJ

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal .... this 11th day of February, 2015 to
Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd., Suite 140
Ogden, UT 84401

/s/Kari L. Kulak
Paralegal

ADDENDUMD
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AFFIDAVIT OF SARAH VALENCIA
SARAH VALENCIA does hereby swear or affirm, upon information and belief
that:
1. - I was a witness in the ·case of State v.

Riqo Perea, and testified at his murder trial.

2. At the time of the trial and before that, I

was under the impression that the police

were pressuring me to testify in a certain way at that trial.
3. I have had some time to think about the testimony that I gave and believe that I
need to correct some of the statements that I made at trial which I believe are not
accurate.
4. I was at the home during the shooting, and I did in fact see Riqo prior to the
· ·shooting, as he was a good" friend of mine. To the best of my recollection he ·was
also at least friendly with Sabrina Prieto, and to the best of my knowledge had
nothing against her or me.
5. After the shooti1:1g occUITed I ~ in shock having lost with my good friend
Sabrina and the police immediately approached me once I arrived at the hospital
and said that I had to talk to them.

6. During the ~nversation with the police, I felt threatened as far as the officers
mentioned I may be losing custody of my son, and getting into trouble unless I
was a witness for them. They informed me that I could either be a witness or I

would be a suspect.

7. I was also very ill that night, and was not feeling good that evening, and therefore
did not eat or drink much at the wedding party, and I was actually throwing up at

the hospital due to my illness and nerves.
8. I told the detectives that I could not see the occupants of the car that I couldn't
see their faces, but the officer insisted that it was Riqo and Bubba (Marquis
Lucero). I informed the police that he couldn't have been Bubba because I didn't
see him there that night.
9. Approximately a month or so after the shooting, I was again questioned by the
police and I overheard the officers talked about the fact that Sabrina was running
toward the garage and was shot in the chest and therefore there may have been a

v; _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

shooter in the garage area. I asked the officers about this fact, and they told me
that although the CSI and found some bullets there, that they didn't believe that
happened. I was confused and scared, and therefore I went along with what the
officers told me to say.
10. I

also recall that prior to the trial occurring I was asked to meet at the

prosecutor's office on 24th and Washington and they showed me maps and again
told me what to say in trial. Again I was scared and worried about my child and
therefore went along with what they told me to testify about.
11. I could not testify that I ever saw Riqo with the gun that evening, and I clearly did

not see the face of the shooter in the vehicle, therefore any testimony that I gave
contradicting those facts would not be accurate.
DATED this

Q, ltd

day of July 2015.

SARAH VALENCIA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

f).~

day of July 2015.

~ ~".h,Ou:_
KARI LYNN KULAK
•
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ADDENDUMB
Petition for Post Conviction Relief

RANDALL WRICHARDS (#4503)
Attorney for Appellant
RICHARDS & BROWN PC
738 University Park Blvd. #140
Clearfield, Utah 84015
Telephone: (801) 773-2080
Facsimile: 1- 801-773-5078
Email: Randy@richardsbrownlaw.com
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

RIQO MARIANO PEREA,

PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner,
Case No.

v.

I~ C'10·1 17 '3
JUDGE:

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.
Pursuant to the Utah Post-conviction Remedies Act and Utah R. Civ. P.
65C, RIQO PEREA hereby petitions the Court for post-conviction relief. He is
currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah.

I.

NAME OF THE RESPONDENT: RIQO PEREA

X Conviction of a felony

X State of Utah

II.

IDENTIFICATION OF CURRENT AND RELATED CASES

1.

(a) Name of Court that entered judgment below: Second District
Court, Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest Jones
presiding.
(b) Location: Ogden, Utah.

1

(c) Case Number: 071901847
2 ..

Date of judgment: ~ay 27, 2010 ..

3. Sentence: Two counts Aggravated Murder, Life without parole. Two
Counts Attempted Murder .
4. Nature of Offenses involved: Two Counts Aggravated Murder
5. What was your plea? Not guilty.

6. Not guilty pled as to all counts.
7. Trial was before a jury.
8. Perea did not testify.
9. Perea appealed from the convictions.
10. Appellate information

(a) Name of Appellate Court: Supreme Court of Utah
(b) Case number: 20100891-SC
(e} Result: Convictions Affirmed. . . -. .

(d) Date of opinion: November 15, 2013.
---(lc'-e'T).....
Ts....SJ.....Jes raised:

Whether the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's ability to
present his
defense by limiting an expert's testimony on crime scene reconstruction.
Whether the trial court erroneously excluded the testimony of defense
expert
Richard G. Ofshe, an expert in false confessions.
Whether this Court should require recording of police interrogations that
occur at
police stations.
Whether an imposition of life without parole, for a nineteen-year-old with
an IQ of 77 violates the United States and Utah Constitutional prohibition on
cruel and unusual

2

punishment, and whether Utah's life without parole statute violates guarantees of
equal
protection and due process.
Whether the combination of the above errors and other unraised errors
constitutes
cumulative error.
III. Grounds for relief:
(a) Ground 1: Whether the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's ·
ability to present his defense by limiting an expert's testimony on crime scene
reconstruction.
Supporting facts for ground 1: The trial court held, pretrial, that the
defense expert would be allowed to present his theory, and that flaws in his
testimony went to its weight. Mid-trial, in response to a last-minute State motion,
the trial court abruptly, and erroneously, changed its decision and prohibited the
defense's forensic scientist from presenting any demonstrative exhibits. The trial
court's ruling unconstitutionally denied the defendant the most persuasive
evidence of his innocence. Additionally, the court unconstitutionally prohibited
the defense expert from contradicting the State's witnesses. This significantly
hampered defendant's ability to present a case which it had prepared for months
prior to trial. The trial court's ruling literally five minutes before the beginning of
the defense presentation of evidence required a complete change in trial strategy
and presentation. Finally, the trial court allowed the State to rebut the defense
expert with its own charts and to comment on the defense expert's testimony,
effectively expressing a preference for the State's case and theory.

3

(b) Ground 2: Whether the trial court erroneously excluded the testimony

of defense expert Richard G. Ofshe, an expert in false confessions.
Supporting facts for ground 2: The trial court prohibited the defense from
presenting expert testimony surrounding false confessions, particularly the
strong possibility that Riqo falsely confessed to this offense. However, the
scientific literature repeatedly supports the proposition that people falsely
confess to crimes, that juries are not aware of the phenomenon, and that juries
tend to overvalue confessions. Expert testimony has repeatedly been held to be
critical to help establish a claim of a false confession and the trial court
erroneously deprived the defense of the opportunity to present this evidence.
(c) Ground 3: Newly discovered•evidence. Whether the trial court erred in
denying Mr. Perea's motion to suppress his confession for a Miranda violation.
Supporting facts for ground 3= The defendant clearly and unequivocally
·· ·invoked his right-to-deal with the poliee-in interrogation.onl-y-with the assistance.
of counsel, although he was not in custody at the time of the invocation. A
defendant can anticipatorily invoke his right to counsel and the police were duty
bound to honor the defendant's request. Hence, the trial court erred in denying

. . . _the..defendanfs motion to suppr~~ theJ~9_nf~io_J:.1~~- ... _____ _
(d) Ground 4: Whether the trial court erroneously failed to allow critical
defense witnesses to testify anonymously in order to protect them from gang
retaliation.
Supporting facts for ground 4: Witnesses approached defense counsel
willing to testify that a person other than Riqo Perea did the shooting at issue in
this case, but that they feared for their safety and wished to testify anonymously.

4

The trial court failed to take necessary steps to protect these witnesses, and in
fact ordered the defense to disclose their names so that law enforcement could
conduct a full investigation. The trial court erroneously took steps that ensured
these witnesses would not cooperate with the court or with defense counsel,
ultimately resulting in the loss of critical defense testimony.
(e) Ground 5: Whether an imposition of life without parole, for a nineteenyear-old with an IQ of 77 violates the United States and Utah Constitutional
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and whether Utah's life without
parole statute violates guarantees of equal protection and due process.
Supporting facts for ground 5: Riqo Perea presented evidence at the
motion hearing that at the time of the offense he was 19 years old and had a full
scale IQ of 77. The Utah and United States Constitutions prohibit sentencing a
19-yearwith an IQ of77 and various mental illnesses to the punishment of life
without parole, as it is cruel and unusual and in violation of unnecessary rigor.
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7 is unconstitutionally vague since it
gives no discretion to the court and denies a defendant proper due process by
removing the sentencing decision from the jury.

REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS
1.

The judgment and commitment being challenged - Attachment 1.

(b) Any decision issued by an appellate court from the direct appeal -

Attachment 2.

5

________ _ ______________ (c1 Aily_i:irevi«?usly-filed petition fo~ :p~st-c~n~<:_~?_Il -~~!i~!!_~~<l.-~~--- _____________________
decision issued as a result. None
(d) Affidavits, records, or other documentary evidence that support your
claim. Attachments 3.
(e) Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Attachment 4.
V. PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH
PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF Davis }ss.

I, the undersigned petitioner, declare under penalty of perjury that the information
have provided in this petition is true and correct.

/s/: RIOO MARIANO PEREA
Signed by Randall W. Richards with Permission from Riqo Perea
SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER

Subscribed and sworn to before me on: 11/12/2014
_Kari Lynn K u l a k ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - NoTARY PUBLIC

Residi~g in: Davis County, UT_
My Commission Expires: _03/29 /2017_ _ _ _ _ _ __

VI. CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY
I certify I am the attorney for petitioner, and that this petition complies with Rule
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
/s/: Randall W. Richards
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY
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ADDENDUM(
Notice of Appeal

RANDALL W. RICHARDSW #4503 of
RICHARDS & BROWN P.C.
938 University Park Blvd., Suite 140
Clearfield, UT 84015
Telephone: (801) 773-2080
Facsimile: (801) 773-5078
lawvers@richardsbrownlaw.com
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RIQO MARIANO PEREA
PETITIONER

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

- ·vs.
)

STATE OF UTAH

Case No.140907173
Judge: JONES

)

RESPONDENT
)

COMES NOW the above named Petitioner, Rico Perea, by and through his
attorney, Randall W. Richards and hereby gives notice of intent to appeal the Order of
Summary Dismissal on the Petitioner's Petition for Relief under the Post Conviction
Remedies Act filed on November 11, 2014, that was entered hereon in the aboveentitled case on or about the 12th day of January 2015 to the Supreme Court of Utah.
DATED this 11th day of February 2015.
_/s/: Randall W. Richards_
RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal .... this 11th day of February, 2015 to
Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd., Suite 140
Ogden, UT 84401
/s/Kari L. Kulak
Paralegal

ADDENDUMD
Affidavit of Sarah Valencia

AFFIDAVIT OF SARAH VALENCIA
SARAH VALENCIA does hereby swear or affirm, upon infonnation and belief

that:
· 1. ·

I was a witness in the ·case of State v. Riqo Perea, and testified at his murder trial.

2.

At the time of the trial and before that, I was under the impression that the police
were pressuring me to testify in a certain way at that trial.

3. I have had some time to think about the testimony that I gave and believe that I
need to correct some of the statements that I made at trial which I believe are not
accurate.
4. I was at the home during the shooting, and I did in fact see Riqo prior to the
· ·shooting, as he was a good· friend of mine. To the best of my recollection he was
also at least friendly with Sabrina Prieto, and to the best of my knowledge had
nothing against her or me.
5. Afte~ the shooting occ~d I ~ in shock having lost wi~h my good friend_
Sabrina and the police immediately approached me once I arrived at the hospital
and said that I had to talk to them.
6. During the ~nversation with the police, I felt threatened as far as the officers
mentioned I may be losing custody of my son, and getting into trouble unless I
was a witness for them. They informed me that I could either be a witness or I

would be a suspect.
7. I was also very ill that night, and was not feeling good that evening, and therefore
did not eat or drink much at the wedding party, and I was actually throwing up at

the hospital due to my illness and nerves.
8. I told the detectives that I could not see the occupants of the car that I couldn't
see their faces, but the officer insisted that it was Riqo and Bubba (Marquis
Lucero). I informed the police that he couldn't have been Bubba because I didn't
see him there that night.
9. Approximately a month or so after the shooting, I was again questioned by the
police and I overheard the officers talked about the fact that Sabrina was running
toward the garage and was shot in the chest and therefore there may have been a

·.j _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

shooter in the garage area. I asked the officers about this fact, and they told me
that although the CSI and found some bullets there, that they didn't believe that
happened. I was confused and scared, and therefore I went along with what the
officers told me to say.
10. I also recall that prior to the trial occurring I was asked to meet at the

prosecutor's office on 24th and Washington and they showed me maps and again
told me what to say in trial. Again I was scared and worried about my child and
therefore went along with what they told me to testify about.
~

11.

-

I could not testify that I ever saw Riqo with the gun that evening, and I clearly did
not see the face of the shooter in the vehicle, therefore any testimony that I gave

_ contradicting those facts would not be accurate.

~nd

DATED this_....~...__·_\.:__ day of July 2015.

SARAH VALENCIA

~~ day of July 2015.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _.,____

~ ~ ,:b.Ou:__
KARI LYNN KULAK
•

...,;

uoTAJff PUBLIC. STATE ot UTAH

cOMMISSION NO. 658161
COMM. EXP. 03/2Q/20'1

:

v -------------------

Notary Public

. -· ··-····-

.

··•

---·-·---·---····-·

ADDENDUME
Witness Statements
iJJ

Angelo Gallegos and Elias Garcia

@

ANGELO GALLEGOS

@

@

1
2
3

the course of the 10 or so minutes that you were there?
A.

Probahly like when we were leaving, getting ready to

leave.

4

Q.

Do you know who was involved in that argurcent?

5

A.

Riqo.

6

Q.

Who else?

7

A.

I don't know.

8

Q.

After that argument happened, what did you do?

9

A.

Was entering the car, getting ready to enter the car

10

Anybody else?

to leave.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

Yeah.

13

Q.

Do you know what the defendant was doing?

14

A.

He was already in the car.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

In the front passenger.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

I heard gunshots.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

I heard one or two, and then there were several

21

And did you then enter the car?

Where was he?

As the car was leaving what happened?

Did you -

do you know how many?

after.

22

Do you know where those gunshots were coming

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

Front passenger.

25

Q.

And how do you know that?

23

fran?

ANGELO GALLEGOS -
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l
2

A.

right in front, the passenger.

Q.

3
4

Because I seen the lights from a gun getting shot off

Okay.

Could you tell where -

defendant' s head, chest and body?

5

A.

His upper body.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Could you see his neck?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

could you see the

Could you see his head?

---

~~-----~---

-·----·-- - · · - - -

Did you see a gun in the defendant's hand as

shots were being fired?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

We were driving toward Washington Boulevard.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

What happened after the shots were · fired?

When you got to Washington Boulevard, do you

know which direction the vehicle turned?

17

A.

Left.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

South.

20

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

Seventh Street.

23

Q.

All right.

21

24
25

That would be south?

After it turned south where did the vehicle

go?

Now, when you got to Seventh Street, what

happened?
A.

There was a threat ma.de toward me and several others.

ANGELO GALLEGOS

-
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1

Q.

And who made that threat?

2

A.

Riqo.

3

Q.

What did he say?

4

A.

If we said anything, 'Lhere would be a bullet with our

5

name on it.

Q.

6

During the course of the travel from the crime scene

7

to the house near Seventh and Washington, did the Defendant say

8

anything else?
A.

9

10

The same thing, there would be a bullet with our

name.

11

MR. SHAW:

12

THE COURT:

That Is all.
Mr. Richards?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

13
14

..)

BY MR. RICHARDS:

15

Q.

Now, you are a member of a gang.

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Were you at that time?

18

A.

No, I was not.

19

Q.

You were not a member of the Ogden Trece gang?

20

A.

I am not.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

Exhibit -

23

individual?

24

A.

25

Q.

My

Is that correct?

brother is, but I am not.

Let me show you an exhibit marked State's

Defense Exhibit No. 1 and ask you if you know this

... Yes.

And who's that?
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1

A.

They call him Dad.

2

Q.

Was he there that night?

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

And whose Dad is he of'?

5

A.

I don't know.

6

Q.

Do you know a Christopher Garcia?

7

A.

Christopher Garcia?

8

Q.

Elias Christopher?

9

A.

Elias.

10

Q.

He's your age, isn't he?

11

A.

Again, I suppose.

12

Q.

Well, you grew up together, didn't you?

13

A.

Well, I don't really know him.

14

I don't know him.

I know Elias.

Elias?

I know him by Elias.

L

I never really hung

out with him, but I know I've seen him around.

15

Q.

Was he in the car that night with you?

16

A.

Yes, he was.

17--

Q.

But you didn't h a n g ~

18

A.

other than that night, no.

19

Q.

That's the only time you've ever hung out with

20

Christopher?

21

A.

Yep.

22

Q.

And you know Riqo?

23

A.

Yes, I do.

24

Q.

And did you hang out with Riqo?

25

A.

Yes, I hung out with ltiqo.
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;)

1

Q.

And did Christopher hang out with Riqo a lot?

2

A.

Not when I was around.

3

Q.

So where did you grow up at?

4

A.

On thirty-second and Lincoln.

s

Q.

And where did Riqo grow up at?

6

A.

At Third below Grant.

7

..;

Grant and Washington Boulevard.

8

Q.

And do you know where Christopher lived and grew up?

9

A.

I do not.

10

Q.

Now,

this

situation that happened .on March

5th,

that

11

night, why were you hanging out with Riqo and Christopher that

12

night?

13
.J

Right above Grant between

14

1S
16

17
18
19
20

21

A.

We were going to go party, going to hang out, drink

Q.

Okay.

beer.
And that's the first time you've ever hung out

with Christopher?

A.

Yep.

I've seen him in school often, but I never -

me and him never associated.
Q.

And it's not true that you are both members of a

gang, you and Christopher?
A.

I am not.

22

MR. SHAW:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE WITNESS:

2S

THE COURT:

Asked and answered, your Honor.

SUstained.
I am not.
You answered that before.
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1
2

3
4

5
6

7

to answer again.
Q.

(BY MR. RICHARDS)

So you were going to go party and

where were you going to go party at, go drinking at?

A.

I don't know.

I didn't know where we were going.

just know we were going to go party.

Q.

So you get into a car and did you know the driver of

the car?

8

A.

No, I do not.

9

Q.

It was a lady, wasn't it?

10

A.

Fran what -

11

Q.

Do you remember her name?

12

A.

I do not.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

There was me, that girl -

16

A.

The driver.

17

I

yeah, fran what I remember, yeah.

And who else was in the car with you?

You said his name was Elias?

Elias, two

kids and another girl.

18

Q.

And the kids were how old?

19

A.

I don't remenber.

20 -

Q.

Okay:·· How about-the·-other girl,- what··was- her name!?-

21

A.

I don't know.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

And so you' re in this car with people you

don't ever know other than Riqo?

24

A.

Uh-huh.

25

Q.

And you're going to go party and get drunk?
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v

1

A.

Yep.

2

Q.

And you don't know where you are going?

3

A.

Don't know.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

OUr intention

was just go party.

And then you stop at a house, and you don't

know Christina?

6

A.

Unh-unh.

7

Q.

And do you know the Navas?

8

A.

I knew Sabrina.

9

There -

10

Q.

Did you see her there at the party?

11

A.

Yeah.

12

Q.

And you heard an argument going on.

13

A.

Yes, I did.

14

Q.

And Riqo was arguing?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And who else was he arguing with?

17

A.

I don't know.

18

Q.

Were there many people there?

19

A.

There was -

20

Q.

Arguing.

21

A.

Explain that again.

22

Q.

Arguing.

..23

24
25

That's the only person I knew _there.

that -

Is that right?

at the party?

MR. SHAW:- Well, objection your Honor.

He obviously

doesn't understand the question.
THE COURT:

May.be just rephrase the question then.
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Q.

l
2

How many people

(BY MR. RICHARDS)

were arguing with

Riqo.?

3

A.

Just one that I can :ecall of.

4

Q.

And was it a male or female?

5

A.

Before the incident happened, it was a female.

6

Q.

So Riqo was arguing with the female?

7

A.

Uh-huh.

8

Q.

And was Elias?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

He wasn't arguing?

11

A.

No.

12

MR. SHAW:

13

MR. RICHARDS:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

MR. SHAW:

16

THE COURT:

17

Well, which Elias?
Well, the one he knows, I guess.
Which -

I don't -

I don't know.

Let's find out which one.
Go ahead.

Maybe you can just clarify

that.

18

Q.

19

A.

I don't know which Elias you are talking about.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

(BY MR. RICHARDS)

Go ahead.

We have the son -

well, I thought you didn't

know this one?

22

A.

I have seen him.

23

Q.

Do you know his name?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Well, then how cane you are confused about which
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)

J

1

Elias then?

2

A.

Because that's what they both go by, is Elias.

3

Q.

Well, I thought you said just a moment ago that you

4

5
6

J

A.

this guy 1 s name was'?

I don 1 t know his nane.

They both go by Elias or Dad.

He goes by Da~.

7

Q.

So if he goes by Dad -

8

A.

And ~ey goes -

9

.J

didn't know what

both Elias or Dad._

That's what he

went by.

so you do know him a little bit?

10

Q.

So -

11

A.

I've seen him, yeah, but I don't know of him.

12

Q.

And he goes by Dad or Elias?

· -- ·13-

A.

.)

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

Okay.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

.J

Or Dad.

I.et' s call him Dad.

So do you see

Dad arguing with anybody?

18

A.

No, I did not.

19

Q.

Did you see Elias arguing with anybody?

20

A.

No, I did not.

21

Q.

And so the only person you saw arguing was Riqo and a

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And you don't know the girl's name?

25

A.

22
-•

.)

We' 11 call him the father.

girl?

. -

(Nodding.)
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1

Q.

And there was only just two of them there arguing?

2

A.

Yeah, just them two.

3

Q.

And then did you see -

4

A.

Yeah.

5

Q.

And did you see who fired that shot?

6

A.

I do not.

7

Q.

Do you know where it came from?

8

A.

I do not.

you said you hear a shot?

l

9

10
11

Q.

Okay.

l.

And once that shot was fired, then everybody

gets in the car?
A.

No.

There was -

before we even entered the car,

12

there was already one or two shots being shot.

13

or two shots before I entered the car.

There was one

14

Q.

And you climbed clear into the back seat?

15

A.

Yep.

16

Q.

And you were by a little kid?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

And how old was she?

19

A.

I don't remember.

20

Q.

Was she two or five or 10 or 15?

21

A.

She was older than 10.

22

Q.

All right.

23

A.

It was me, Elias, Riqo and the two kids, the driver.

24

That was it.

25

Q.

----

Okay.

I was by the girl in the back.

I....

And who else gets into the car?

And Elias was in the middle seat?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And so then the car starts driving?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And shots are being fired?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

But you aren't able to see in which direction they

7

were being fired?

8

A.

I do not.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

I looked

A.

up and I seen shots being fired fran the

right passenger of the vehicle that I was in.

Q.

13
14

You said you couldn't see them being fired, though,

could you?

15

A.

Unh-unh.

But I heard -

I heard them.

You can only

16

hear fran what a gunshot sounds like when you' re four feet

17

away.

18
19

Q.
approach -

r·

understand.

And they were driving down -

if I may

so you get into the car here?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And then -

22

A.

In front of the car.

23

Q.

So right here?

24

A.

Right here.

25

Q.

Okay.

well, where's the argument?

Also it's right here, right?

ANGELO GALLEGOS )

you didn't see them being

fired?

11
12

And you don't -

Cross by MR.
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argument

1

A.

2

4

Q.

And then you hear sare shots?

5

A.

Two.

6

Q.

And you don't know where they came fran?

7

A.

Unh-unh.

8

Q.

And then they get into the car and then what happens?

9

A.

There wasn't even a chance for -

-

One or two shots.

we were already in

the vehicle once I heard the shots.

11

Q.

So you were in the vehicle -

12

A.

Well, I wasn't in the vehicle at the time, but I was

I was entering -

~

I was entering the car when I heard the

shots.

14

-

That's where the

argument was.

13

.

That's where the car \vas parked.

3

10

-

was?

15

Q.

And was Riqo in the vehicle when -

16

A.

Yes, he was.

1'7--- -

18

--Q,

And so he '.S-not-.the...one that did the two shot.s_th.en, _

li..,

right?
no -

don't lmow.

19

A.

I have

20

Q.

Well, you heard -

I

But after I seen ~

according to your testimony, you

21

heard him shoot moments later, and you could tell it was him

22

shooting?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And so if you couldn't tell at that moment, then it

25

-

must have been sc::mebody else that was firing these two shots.
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J

1

.)

2

A.

Yes .

3

Q.

Okay.

4
.)

)

J

J

Is that a fair statement?

And so then you get into the car, and does it

bac:k up a little bit and then go out?

5

A.

No, it accelerated forward.

6

Q.

Was there a car parked right here in front of it?

7

A.

Not that I can remember.

8

Q.

If there was, it would have had to hit it, or she

9

would have?

10

A.

I don't remember.

11

Q.

Okay.

I -

So they accelerate forward driving down the

12

street, and several shots are fired as they drive down the

13

street?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

How fast was the car going?

16

A.

I don't know.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

I don't remember.

19

Q.

Do you remember what you were wearing?

20

A.

I don't.

21

Q.

Okay.

I don't remember.

)

22

Was Elias wearing a white shirt, or were you?

Now, let me show you this Exhibit No. 2 .

you identify that?

23

A.

That's me.

24

Q.

That's a picture of you?

25

A.

Yeah.
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1

Q.

2

Okay.

I 1 d move for Exhibit No. 2 to be admitted.
It's irre1evant, your Honor.

MR. SHAW:

It's a

3

photograph of the witness; ccmpletely irrelevant to this case.

4

And ma.y we approach the bench?

5

THE COURT:

All right.

(Discussion held at the bench.}

6

All right.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. RICHARDS:

9

11

I think that 1 s all the questions I

Just a moment.

have.

Q.

10

I' 11 sustain the objection.

(BY MR. RICHARDS)

Do you ever recall attending a

barbecue with Elias senior or Dad as you call him?

12

A.

No, I do not.

13

Q.

With your brother Jeremy?

14

A.

No, I do

15

Q.

Did you have a gun that night?

16

A~

No.

17

Q.

Were you dumping or unloading a weapon that night?

18

A.

No, I was not.

not.

19

MR. RICHARDS:

20

THE COURT:

21
22

That's all the questions I have.

Mr. Shaw any other questions?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHAW:

23

Q.

Just so we are clear about who exited the Yukon, do

24

you recall whether the driver exited or did she stay in the

25

car?
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ELIAS GARCIA

1

Q.

That's what you and Riqo were, the younger ones .

.2

Then you have -

after you' re in the late twenties or something

3

like that you become a haney?

4

A.

I den' t know.

5

Q.

I understand you didn't, but you know the process.

I didn't get to that stage.

6

Is that right?

And eventually you become an original gangster.

7

Correct me if I am not telling you right.

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

That's correct?

All right.

And you understand that

10

an original gangster has some authority over the pee wee

11

homeys, correct?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

An original gangster can order a pee wee homey to

14

take the faJ.l for another person.
A.

15

Could I ask what you are trying to ask me?

16

just get to the point?

17

questions.

18

Q.

Is that right?

Because you are confusing me with these

Well, I'm trying to be as clear as I can.

Does the

the origina1 gangster has the ability to give orders to pee

19

-

20

wee homeys, correct?

Which you were.

21

A.

Well, we make our own decisions.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Could you

But you' re influenced by what the 0G says?

It 's true, is it not, that the original

gangster occasionally tells a pee wee to take the faJ.l for

ELIAS GARCIA
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l
2

3
4

another crime, somebody else's crime, isn't it?
A.

I don't think anybody in their right mind would take

the fall for somebody else's crime.

Q.

No, except that if you don't do what the original

5

gangster says, then you may be hurt, your family may be hurt,

6

correct?

7

A.

Correct.

8

Q.

So if you don't want to get hurt or you don't want

9

10

You may -

your family to get hurt, you do what the original gangster
tells you to do?

11

A.

Not, not all the time.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

No.

14

any of my -

15

told me to go do something, if I didn't want to do it, I

16

wouldn't act upon it because they told me to go do it.

17

Q.

Usually?
There's nobody -

I ain't never ever listened to

over a gangster, the original gangsters.

If there's -

If they

if you don't do something that the

18

original SJclllgster tells you to do, they have ways of scaring

19

you into doing that, don't they?

20

A.

Um, I don 1 t see how.

21

Q.

Well, a drive-by shooting of a home, for instance.

22

You are aware that those occur, aren't you?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Yes?

25

And if someone were to drive by Riqo's home or

his grandma's home where he would stay and shoot it up, that
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)

1

would be a warning situation,. wouldn't it?

2

A.

But from. the side.

3

Q.

Well, are you aware

4

A.

Because there's two gangs -

)

5

j

J

two gangs involved in

this, not just one.

6

Q.

I understand.

7

A.

So what side, what $ide you talking about?

8

Q.

Either side.

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

You're aware that Riqo's grandma's house has been

11

I

couldn't tell you.

I -

shot at least twice since this incident occurred A.

It's been shot at multiple times before this occurred

14

Q.

Okay.

- 15

A.

It Is been bombed.

16

Q.

All right.

12

13
.)

What are you talking about?

too .

A Molotov cocktail, right?

That' s a

)

17

cannister full of gasoline that gets thrown onto that house.

18

And those are sometimes done as warnings, aren't they, that you

19

better do what the 0G says or you are going to have trouble,

20

correct?

21

A.

(Nodding. )

22

Q.

All right .

And since this has happened, at least

23

twice Riqo's house to the best of your knowledge has been

24

drive-by shot or molotoved?

25

A.

I haven't known it's been shot or been drive-by.
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I...

1· haven 1 t.had ariy affiliation to do with Riqo or anything towards
2

that nature of the gang life or anything.

3

move on with my life.

4

Trece' s.

5

from Ogden Trece I s for doing what I am doing today from what I

6

did.

I've been trying to

And then I get threats from Ogden

I get shot at frea'n Ogden T~ece' s.

I get chased by

7

Q.

You go to Iowa, didn 1 t you?

8

A.

Yes.

9

.Q.

And.you were afraid of the.~orterios at that point,

10

weren't you?

11

A.

12

Is that why you went to Iowa?

No.

I went to Iowa because even before that

happened, I was trying to change my life.

13

Q.

But you went to . Iowa because a . fellow by the name. of .

14

Paul Ashfield (phonetic) was shot in retaliation by Nortenos

15

for this incident.

Is that correct?

16

A.

I didn't go to Iowa because of that.

17

Q.

You went irrmediately after that, didn't you, within a

19

A.

I already had my ticket.

20

Q.

Okay.

18

21

· 22

day?

Do you remember talking to an officer Gent in

Iowa?
A.-- ·Do-z remember-talking·-to·him?

23

Q.

Yes.

24

A.

When he came out?

25

Q.

Do you remember an Officer Gent?
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1

A.

Yes, I got in contact with him.

2

Q.

And did you tel.l him that when he asked you it I s

3

tough, at least you were smart enough to get out of there and

4

asked you who Paul was.

Do you recall him asking you that?

5

A.

Um, I really don't recall him asking me that.

6

Q.

You don't recall that?

.7

And you said, "Who hit Paul?"

Do you recall telling that to Officer Gent?

8

A.

No.

I -

9

Q.

All right.

.10-

A.

I remember--talking to Officer Gent, but I- don't -

You don't recall that?

11

don't recall.

I don't -

12

taJ.ked to him about that.

13

didn I t, but I don't remember.

·I

it's not caning back to me that I
I probably did.

14

Q.

A long time ago?

15

A.

Yeah.

16

Q.

Over two and a half years ago?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And you -

I'm not saying I

I want to go a little bit to what your

19

rendition is of what happened that night of August 5th at this

20

location here on the map.

21

passenger seat?

You said that Riqo was in the front

22

A.

That's right.

23

Q.

And you saw him shoot the gun?

24

A.

That IS right•

25

Q.

And how did -

how would you see him shoot the gun?
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A.

1

2

Because he was hanging out the -

the car when he did it.

he was hanging out

I was right behind him.

3

Q.

You were behind him?

4

A.

Right behind him.

5

Q.

And so he's hanging out so you can see him through

6
7

8
9

10

the windshield or where?

A.

I'd have to be in the front to see him through the

windshield.

Q.

I was in the back seat.

So you see him hanging out.

Where is he hanging out

is 111¥ question?

11

A.

The driver -

12

Q.

He's hanging out the passenger front seat window?

13

the passenger front seat.

Door?
.....

14

A.

Door.

15

Q.

So the door is open?

16

A.

I just know that he was hanging out, holding onto the

17

thing that he climbed into the

Or do you remember?

SUV

with firing a gun.

18

Q.

There's a handle right there?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Kind of part way down in the front of the window.

21

he's hanging out holding that?

22

you are saying?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Is that right.

So

Is that what

And so you are seeing him shoot through the

front windshield, or how are you seeing him?
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1

A.

He's shooting over a car back towards the people

2

because we was driving off.

3

back towards the group.

4

5
6
7

Q.

All right.

So he was shooting over the car

And so you didn't actually see him fire

the gun; you just heard it?

A.

We.ll, I heard the gun go off, and then I seen the gun

when he came back in with it.

8

Q.

Did you have a gun that night?

9

A.

Did I have a gun that night?

10

Q.

Yes.

11

A.

Yes, I did.

12

Q.

Did you fire it?

13

A.

No, I didn't.

14

Q.

Now, after you drove away -

15

well, let me ask this.

Do you know Angelo

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

-

18

A.

Yes, I do.

19

Q.

How long have you known Angelo?

20

A.

Fo'=---~--~~~~~e, f°-r _c9. __little

... 21

Gallegos?

~l:~~--- ~or_ probab)-y about

the same time, if not longer as nru.ch as I've known- Riqo.

22

Q.

So you've known him almost as long as you've known

24

A.

About as long.

25

Q.

Did you hang out with Angelo?

23

Riqo?

About as long.
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1

A.

Not really that much.

2

Q.

But he knew who you were?

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

Did you go to barbecues with him?

5

A.

Yes.

6

We were -

I went to a barbecue at his house at

one point.

7

Q.

A ba:cbecue at his brother Jeremy's place?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And you hung out with him?

10

So he would know who you

are, wouldn't he?

11.

A.

Yes..

12

Q.

Did he know your name?

- i:r

A.

Yes·: -

14

Q.

So if he denied knowing you, he's lying?

15

A.

I guess.

16

Q.

I want to talk about after you left the scene.

17

-

..

...... ·- .. .

Did

you never heard Riqo threaten anybody, did you?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

- . ·(;,,

I heard him be confused.

He was confused, but he never threatened to

put a bullet in anybody?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Now, you talked to Detective Gent because you were

23

worried that you were going to get charged with this crime,

24

weren't you?

25

A.

I called Detective Gent because my cousin Sarah got
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1

ahold of me.

2

Q.

And that's Sarah Valencia?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

And me and her had a good talk.

6

Q.

And you were afraid that you were going to get turned

7

in and charged with this crime, were you not?
Judge, I would object.

The witness is

in the middle of trying to answer a question.

Counsel didn't

8
9

10

MR. HEWARD:

give him a chance to finish and went on to the next one.

11

12

THE COURT:

Are you done with your answer, or do you

need a second?
(BY MR. RICHARDS)

13

Q.

14

A.

15

ahold of me.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

And we talked.

it.

19

didn't want to see me -

20

that did it.

21

Q.

23

Yeah, please answer.

I got ahold of rrry cousin Sarah.

18

22

And --

She knew who did it.

Okay.

My cousin Sarah got

And she knew it wasn't me that did
And she didn't want to see me

she

see it be framed on me for the one

So you decided to talk to Detective Gent

because of that?
A.

(Nod.ding. )

I decided to talk to Detective Gent

24

because not only because of that, because I found out it was

25

right for me to be honest and for -
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1

Q.

And -

2

A.

-- and for people that involved with this to know the

3

truth.

Q.

4

5

and for what?

Okay.

And you haven't been very honest in a lot of

things, have you?

6

A.

Been honest about what?

7

your question.

8

you say that.

Q.

9

You got to be specific about

I don't know exactly what you are saying when

Let me ask another question.

Shortly after you were

10

dropped. off, you went -

you got picked up and went in another

11

car driven by Brian Moore or a Tara Sweet.

Is that correct?

12

A.

A who?

13

Q.

A Brian Moore and Tara Sweet.

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Do you recall telling Brian Moore

16
17

I' 11 object, Judge.

MR. HEWARD:

MR. RICHARDS:

19

THE COURT:

Well, I think I can ask him -

I' 11 give you a little latitude, but his

answer is he doesn't know who this fellow is.

21
22

He said he didn't

recall.

18

20

Do you recall that?

Q.

(BY MR. RICHARDS)

You don't recall getting in a

car

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

-

25

A.

We didn't get into a car with no guy naned Brian.

with a fellow?
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1

Q.

And do you recall talking or telling Brian that you

2

may have seen me on the news; I '.m the one that shot the two

3

people?

4

A.

5

No.

I don't even know who this Brian guy is.

don't even know nobody by the name of Brian.

6

Q.

You don't know Brian

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

-- Moore or a Tara Sweet?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

I think that's all I have.

MR. HEWARD:

12

13

I

I just have one follow up.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. HEWARD:

14

Q.

Chris, what caliber gun did you have that night?

15

A.

I had a 25.

16

Q.

Was that gun even functioning?

17

A.

It had no firing pin.

18

MR. HEWARD:

19

THE COURT:

20
21

22
23
24
25

That's all.
Any questions?
RECROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. RICHARDS:
Q.

It seems a little odd to me in that MR. HEWARD:

little odd to me.

I'll object, your Honor, to it seems a

That 's not a question.

THE COURT:

Yeah.
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